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The first essay examines how the outcome of prior repurchasing activity influences
future repurchasing decisions. We find strong evidence that future decisions to
repurchase equity are negatively influenced by poorly timed past repurchases.
Specifically, we show that the past losses on stock repurchases reduce the propensity to
engage in additional repurchases in the future. We find almost no evidence that past gains
on repurchases positively or negatively influence future repurchasing activity. These
results are robust to various firm characteristics, estimation and sampling methods.
Further analyses show that losses on past repurchases influence dividend policy. We
show that the dividend-repurchase substitution rate slows down for firms that experience
losses in their past repurchase activities. Overall, results suggest that managerial
behavioral biases have a strong influence on future repurchase decisions consistent with
the loss-aversion concept of prospect theory.
The second essay examines the relation between insider (officers and directors) open
market transactions and the outcome of past insider trading to better understand what
motivates insiders to trade. We find strong evidence that open market purchases made by
insiders are negatively influenced by poorly timed insider purchases. Specifically, we
show that the losses on insider purchases reduce the intensity of open market purchases.
We find almost no evidence that past gains from insider trading positively or negatively

influence open market purchases. These results are robust to various firm characteristics,
estimation and sampling methods. The results suggest that managerial behavioral biases
have a strong influence on future insider purchasing activity consistent with the lossaversion concept of prospect theory. Further analyses show that loss aversion can
enhance insider wealth by helping insiders avoid a loss of 5.7% over the course of the
next year under certain circumstances while refraining from loss aversion under certain
circumstances can help insiders to net an average of 8.14% over the following year.
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Essay 1
Does Past Performance of Stock Repurchases Affect Future Repurchase Decisions?
1. Introduction
Stock repurchases are risky investments made by management on behalf of
current shareholders. There is an extensive literature which documents “rational”
motivations for managers repurchasing their firm’s stock. By rational we simply mean
stock repurchases are used as a tool that benefits the firm’s shareholders in some way by
increasing, or at least holding constant, firm value. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner
(2008) provide anecdotal evidence of firms repurchasing their stocks at high prices prior
to the 2008 financial crisis. They question managers’ ability to time the market and ask
whether repurchasing activity will ever return to pre-2008 levels.
At odds with this notion of rationality is the recent empirical work of Bonaime et
al. (2012) who find that, on average, managers exhibit a propensity to mis-time stock
repurchases and in the process destroy significant amounts of shareholder wealth. Their
empirical findings suggest the possibility of additional behavioral factors that may
influence repurchase activity. In particular, Bonaime et al. (2012) document a tendency
of managers to repurchase more after their stock has gone up, and less after their firm’s
stock price has fallen, which leads to lower returns, on average. This finding suggests
that managerial repurchase decisions may be influenced by prior stock returns, and may
actually destroy shareholder value. The results of Bonaime et al. (2012) follow a line of
research suggesting investment decisions may be influenced by past returns1.
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Ippolito (1992) shows inflows to mutual funds are strongly correlated with past fund performance.
Empirical work by Dichev (2007), Friesen and Sapp (2007) and Frazzini and Lamont (2008) indicates that
poor investment-timing decisions, in which investors buy after past gains and sell after past losses, destroys
investor wealth
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We hypothesize that managerial stock repurchases are also influenced by the rate
of return on the existing portfolio of repurchased stock generated from prior gains and
losses from stock repurchases. This is consistent with research demonstrating that in a
variety of contexts, decisions under uncertainty can be substantially affected by the
outcomes of past decisions (see for example, Thaler 1980; Staw 1981; Arkes and Blumer
1985). Thaler and Johnson (1990) investigate how prior gains and losses affect risk
taking behavior. Based on experimental data from Cornell undergraduate and MBA
students they find increased willingness to take risk after prior gains, which they refer to
as the “house money effect”. However, after experiencing a prior loss, individuals
showed increased loss aversion and reduced willingness to take risk.
If past gains and losses influence repurchase decisions, then only including recent
stock returns in one’s model may fail to capture this effect. This is because repurchases
are not made smoothly, and thus the gains and losses on the portfolio are affected by past
returns, as well as the timing of the cash flows used to purchase stock. Thus, we begin
our empirical work by calculating firm-level gains and losses on repurchased stock, and
examining the impact of past repurchase returns on the decision to repurchase new
shares. In this empirical work, we examine gains and losses separately to allow for the
possibility of an asymmetric response, which might obtain if managers exhibit loss
aversion (Johnson and Thaler, 1990). We find evidence of loss aversion; specifically that
firms are unlikely to repurchase stocks when they lose money from past stock
repurchases; and almost no evidence that past gains on repurchases influence future
repurchasing activity even after controlling for variables previously shown to affect
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repurchase activity (e.g. cash, cash flow, book-to-market ratio, firm size, past one-quarter
return, etc.).
To control for the possibility that our results are not actually due to managerial
biases or loss aversion, but due to some unobservable firm-level feature, we examine
cross-sectional variation in the results as a function of two CEO-level characteristics:
tenure and age. We find that managers’ decreased propensity to conduct stock
repurchases given losses from prior stock repurchases (loss aversion) is more pronounced
in firms whose CEOs have shorter tenure.
We also provide some evidence suggesting that given losses from prior stock
repurchasing activity further increases in losses are associated with lower levels of
spending on stock repurchases and no evidence that additional gains have any effect on
the level of spending on stock repurchases.
Finally, we show that the “loss-aversion” effect on repurchases indirectly affects
dividend payouts. Specifically, the dividend-repurchase substitution rate slows down for
firms that experience losses in their past repurchase activities.
The findings in this study contribute to the literature in several ways. First, while
Bonaime et al. (2012) provide evidence of managers unsuccessfully timing the markets,
we show that the outcome of prior stock repurchases influences current repurchasing, and
that managers respond differently to past gains and losses. In addition to managers’
documented inability to time the markets, the “bad timing” subsequently decreases their
propensity to conduct stock repurchases. Second, we present evidence of the substitution
hypothesis between dividends and stocks repurchases, and show that the substitution rate
is influenced by gains and losses on past repurchases. Finally, this study is the first study
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to document a link between loss aversion and stock repurchases, and compliments
existing work of Ben-David et al. (2007) and Baker and Wurgler (2012) which suggests
overconfidence and optimism as behavioral determinants of stock repurchases. It also
compliments Baker and Wurgler (2011) which relates prospect theory to payout policy by
modeling dividends in a framework in which investors are loss averse to reductions in
dividends.
The study proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on stock
repurchases and develops the hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data used in the study.
Section 4 presents the tests of our main hypothesis while section 5 provides the
implications prior losses and gains from stock repurchased have on dividend policy.
Section 6 concludes.

2. Literature Review and Motivation
2.1 Determinants of Stock Repurchases
This section provides a brief overview of the literature on the determinants of
stock repurchases, which we organize into the following broad categories: firm cash
flow, undervaluation, firm leverage, managerial stockholdings and corporate control.
2.1.1

Firm Cash Flow
Like dividends, repurchases can be used to alleviate agency problems associated

with excess cash flow. The noncommittal nature of stock repurchases, particularly open
market repurchases (the most popular type), gives repurchases an advantage over
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dividends. Most papers hypothesize that high levels of excess cash or cash flow are
positively related to both the decision to repurchase and the level of stock repurchases.
Dittmar (2000) conducts tobit regressions by years and finds a positive and statistically
significant relationship between cash, and the level of stock repurchases and between
cash flow and the level of stock repurchases holding investment opportunities constant.
Lie (2000) finds that in years prior to the announcement of tender offers firms tend to
have higher levels of undistributed cash flows compared to their industry medians.
Babenko et al (2011) find cash and cash flows are positively and significantly related to
completion rates and the level of open market share repurchases. Finally Bonaime et al
(2012) find that firms with higher levels of cash and cash flows are more likely to
repurchase stocks.
Lie (2000) finds that dividend increases are used to disgorge permanent increases
in cash flows while special dividends and tender offers are used to disgorge temporary
increases. The paper also finds positive stock market reactions to the announcements of
tender offers and special dividends and presents this as evidence that tender offers and
special dividends can be used to mitigate the free cash flow problem (contrary to the
signaling hypothesis according to which disbursements signal positive information about
a firm’s future cash flows). Grullon and Michaely (2002) show that firms finance
repurchases with funds (cash) that otherwise would have been used to increase dividends,
which supports the “substitution hypothesis”.
2.1.2. Firm undervaluation
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Dittmar (2000) suggests firms repurchase equity to correct and even signal
undervaluation by timing the market. According to this motive, managers would
repurchase the firm’s stock when they believe the stock is undervalued. Such actions can
be viewed by the market as a signal or as an investment and are followed by positive
market reactions. According to this hypothesis increases in stock prices following the
announcement of a repurchase program is due to information revealed by the
announcement (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998).
One group of studies uses insider trading as a proxy for firm undervaluation. For
example, Dann (1981) and Vermaelen (1981) examine market reactions to repurchase
announcements and find that managers essentially waive their rights to sell shares in
repurchase tender offers. This suggests managers announce tender offers when they
believe the firm’s stock is undervalued. Vermaelen (1981) holds that firms use stock
repurchases to signal either that the firm has no positive NPV projects and has to pay out
free cash flows (this would be consistent with the excess cash flow hypothesis discussed
earlier) or that the firm is undervalued.
Instead of using market reaction to infer market timing, D’Mello and Shroff
(2000) test the timing hypothesis directly by estimating a perfect foresight economic
value (intrinsic value) of the firm and compare it to current market prices. They find that
74% of the firms in their sample conduct fixed-price tender repurchase offers when the
market price is below the firm’s intrinsic value. They also find that insiders of
undervalued firms are net buyers while those of overvalued firms are net sellers. This
result is consistent with Lee et al (1992) who find that managers adjust their personal
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trading behavior prior to tender offer repurchases as though they had private information
about their firm that is conveyed by the repurchase.
Babenko et al (2011) hypothesize and find that executives who buy back shares
before an announcement add credibility to the undervaluation signal. Specifically they
find that insiders of announcing firms purchase significantly more stock one and two
years prior to the repurchase announcement than insiders of matching firms, especially
when information asymmetry between insiders and investors is large. They test and find
that program completion rates of such programs increase with insider purchases.
Bonaime and Ryngaert (2011) examine whether firms and insiders trade in the same
direction and find that insider trading at repurchasing firms is not always consistent with
undervaluation. They find that insider buying and selling are more frequent in quarters
when firms are repurchasing non-trivial amounts of stock. A puzzling result from this
paper is that share repurchases are most frequent when insiders are net sellers. One
explanation of this is that firm insiders generally trade in a contrarian manner. Thus
repurchasing firms with net insider buying in the same quarter are more likely to be
undervalued (earn positive abnormal returns after repurchases) than firms with net insider
selling in that quarter.
Other proxies for firm undervaluation include asset size and past stock returns.
Varmaelen (1981) holds that information asymmetry may be more pronounced in small
firms because they are less covered by analysts and the popular press, and finds that
smaller firms tend to have larger announcement returns. Dittmar (2000) hypothesizes a
negative relationship between the natural log of assets and the level of repurchases but
finds the opposite. On the other hand, Babenko et al (2011) find a negative and
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significant effect on buy and hold announcements returns and a positive and significant
effect on actual repurchases. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) hypothesize and find a
negative relationship between stock performance and the level of repurchases and
Bonaime et al (2012) find a negative relationship between a firm’s returns in the prior
quarter and the likelihood of repurchasing.
Another proxy for undervaluation is the market-to-book ratio (although it can also
be used to control for a firm’s investment opportunities2). Dittmar (2000) holds that while
historical returns are a backward-looking measure of valuation and may not detect current
misvaluation, a firm’s market-to-book ratio may indicate a firm’s potential for
undervaluation. Thus Dittmar (2000) hypothesizes and finds a negative relationship
between the market-to-book ratio and the level of stock repurchases, thus indicating
managers may be using stock repurchases to take advantage of undervaluation. In
contrast, Bonaime et al (2012) find a positive relationship between book-to-market and
the likelihood of repurchasing and presents this as evidence that firms time the market
badly.3
2.1.3. Firm Leverage
Stock repurchases increase firms’ leverage ratios, ceteris paribus. To the extent
that firms have an optimal capital structure, firms may use stock repurchase to achieve
their target. Dittmar (2000) hypothesizes and finds lower optimal leverage ratios for
repurchasing firms compared with non-repurchasing firms. Specifically if a firm’s net
leverage ratio is lower than its target, then it may repurchase to increase leverage.
2
3

Babenko et al (2011) use the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for Tobin’s Q
Based on the November 2011 draft
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Baker and Wurgler (2002) offer a theory in which capital structure is the
cumulative outcome of past attempts to time equity markets. The main finding of their
study is that low (high) leverage firms raise funds when their market values (M/B) are
high (low). In other words, low leverage firms repurchase stocks when their market
values were low. Consistent with this, Bonaime et al (2012) find a negative relationship
between leverage (total liabilities scaled by assets) and the decision to repurchase.
2.1.4. Other Cited Determinants of Repurchases
Since the shares provided to managers when they exercise their stock options
come from treasury stock, preserving the stock value may be a motive for stock
repurchases when management holds stock options. Dittmar (2000) finds a positive
relationship between outstanding stock options and repurchasing activity. A potential
target can use repurchases to increase acquisition costs hence stock repurchases can be
used as a takeover defense. Stock repurchases increase acquisition costs because the
selling shareholders are those with the lowest reservation price. Thus by repurchasing, a
firm can increase the lowest price for which a stock is available (Dittmar, 2000).
2.2. The Effect of Past Gains & Losses on Risk-Taking Behavior
The extensive literature discussed above captures what we will label “rational”
motivations for repurchasing the firm’s stock. By rational we simply mean that in each
of the cited papers, repurchasing is used as a tool that benefits the firm’s shareholders in
some way by increasing, or at least holding constant, firm value. At odds with this notion
of rationality is the recent empirical work of Bonaime et al. (2012) who find that, on
average, managers exhibit a propensity to mis-time stock repurchases and in the process
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destroy significant amounts shareholder wealth. Their empirical findings suggest the
possibility of additional behavioral factors that may influence repurchase activity. In
particular, Bonaime et al. (2012) document a tendency of managers to repurchase more
after their stock has gone up, and less after their firm’s stock price has fallen, which leads
to lower returns, on average. This finding suggests that managerial repurchase decisions
may be influenced by prior stock returns, and may actually destroy shareholder value.
The results of Bonaime et al. (2012) follow a line of research suggesting
investment decisions may be influenced by past returns. For instance, Ippolito (1992)
shows inflows to mutual funds are strongly correlated with past fund performance.
Empirical work by Friesen and Sapp (2007), Frazzini and Lamont (2008) and Dichev
(2007) indicates that poor investment-timing decisions, in which investors buy after past
gains and sell after past losses, destroy a significant percentage of investor wealth.
We hypothesize that in addition to being influenced by recent returns, managerial
repurchases may also be influenced by gains and losses on the existing portfolio of
repurchased stock. This is consistent with research demonstrating that in a variety of
contexts decisions under uncertainty can be substantially affected by the outcomes of past
decisions (see for example, Thaler 1980; Staw 1981; Arkes and Blumer 1985). Thaler
and Johnson (1990) investigate how prior gains and losses affect risk taking behavior and
find based on experimental data from Cornell undergraduate and MBA students an
increased willingness to take risk after prior gains, which they refer to as the “house
money effect”. However, after experiencing a prior loss, individuals showed increased
loss aversion, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as the “snakebite effect”. Their
results suggest that losses are more painful if they happen after prior losses and less
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painful if they occur after prior gains, since prior gains act as cushions for future losses.
Frino, Grant and Johnstone (2007) examine Australian futures traders and find supporting
evidence, that traders take on more risk in the afternoon on days with morning gains.
Low (2004) finds that prior losses are associated with increased loss aversion, which is
consistent with the snakebite effect. However, the evidence on the effect of past gains
and losses is mixed. Coval and Shumway (2005) find that traders with morning losses
increase risk-taking in the afternoon.
Regardless of the precise nature of the relationship, if past gains and losses
influence repurchase decisions, then including only recent stock returns in one’s model
may fail to capture this effect. This is because repurchases are not made smoothly, and
thus the gains and losses on the portfolio are affected both by past returns, and the timing
of the cash flows used to purchase stock. We begin our empirical work by calculating at
the firm-level gains and losses on repurchased stock, and examining the impact of past
repurchase returns on the decision to repurchase new shares and the amount of shares
repurchased. In this empirical work, we examine gains and losses separately to allow for
the possibility of an asymmetric response, which might obtain if CEOs exhibit loss
aversion (Johnson and Thaler, 1990).
To control for the possibility that our results are not actually due to managerial
biases or loss aversion, but to some unobservable firm-level feature, we examine crosssectional variation in the results as a function of two CEO-level characteristics: tenure
and age. Prendergast and Stole (1996) present a model in which individuals want to
acquire a reputation for quickly learning a correct course of action. This desire leads to
two types of sub-optimal behavior: exaggeration, in which individuals respond too much
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to new information; and conservatism, in which behavior is not changed enough in the
light of new information. In their model, individuals early in their job tenure tend to
respond too much, while those with longer tenure respond too little. Drawing upon these
results, we hypothesize that CEOs with the shortest tenure will exhibit behavior that is
most sensitive to realized gains and losses, while long-tenure CEOs will be the least
sensitive.
With respect to the link between age and loss aversion, Johnson et al. (2006) find
an increasing relationship between risk aversion and age, while Hjorth and Fosgerau
(2009) find that loss aversion increases with age up to around 55 years, and then declines
rapidly. Because the majority of CEOs in the sample are in the 50 to 57 years age range,
it is unclear whether one should expect a linear relationship between loss aversion and
age.
Finally, to the extent that prior gains and losses from stock repurchases affect
future repurchasing activity we test if the gains and losses have any effect on other
corporate activities specifically, dividend policy and cash holdings of firms . With respect
to dividend, can the outcome of past stock repurchases provide evidence consistent with
the dividend substitution hypothesis documented by Grullon and Michaelly (2002)? We
hypothesize that to the extent dividends and stock repurchases are substitutes, the
substitution of stock repurchases for dividends will be weaker (stronger) for firms that
repurchase their stock and have prior losses (gains).
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3. Data and Sample Construction
We begin with US firms in COMPUSTAT and CRSP. The sample spans the
period 1984-2011. A firm enters the sample the first quarter it repurchases at least 0.1
percent of its shares outstanding and remains in the sample until it either delists or until
the end of 2011. We also limit the sample to nonfinancial and nonutility firms by
dropping firms with SIC codes 6000 to 6999 and 4900 to 4999 and require firms to have
CRSP share codes 10 and 11. This results in 232,308 firm-quarter observations and 6460
firms.
Following Banyi, Dyl, and Kahle (2008), we compute the dollars spent on stock
repurchases as COMPUSTAT’s quarterly purchase of common and preferred stock from
the cash flow statement (PRSTKCY, adjusted for the fact that this variable is year to
date) minus any decreases in reported balance sheet preferred stock (PSTKQ). Then
following Bonaime (2012), we express the dollars spent on stock repurchases as a
percentage of the firm’s market capitalization in the prior quarter. A firm first enters the
sample the first quarter this variable is at least 0.1 percent. Later we transform this
variable into a binary variable which equals 1 if the condition is met else zero as the
dependent variable in logit regressions.
The primary goal of this paper is to test if the returns from prior stock repurchases
(REPO_RET) have any effect on future repurchasing activity and if yes, are managers
more sensitive to prior losses than they are to prior gains. The main variable, REPO_RET
is constructed as follows:
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•

Step 1: Following Banyi, Dyl, and Kahle (2008) we compute the quarterly
cost of stock repurchases as COMPUSTAT’s quarterly purchase of common
and preferred stock from the cash flow statement (PRSTKCY, adjusted for the
fact that this variable is year to date) minus any decreases in reported balance
sheet preferred stock (PSTKQ).

•

Step 2: Following Banyi, Dyl, and Kahle (2008) we estimate the numbers of
shares repurchased in a given quarter by dividing the quarterly cost of stock
repurchases (from step one) by the stock repurchase price which is the average
closing stock prices for each month in a given quarter.

•

Step 3: For each quarter, we cumulate the number of shares repurchased by
each firm starting from the quarter the firm first enters the sample to the end
of the current quarter while adjusting for stock splits. Then we multiply this
by the closing stock price of the quarter to get the cumulative market value of
shares repurchased. Conversely, we compute the associated cumulative cost of
stock repurchases by cumulating the quarterly cost of stock repurchases from
step 1.

•

Step 4: Finally, to get the returns of repurchased stocks (REPO_RET), we
subtract the cumulative cost of stock repurchases from the cumulative market
value of stock repurchases and scale it by the end of quarter book value of
assets. The rational for scaling by the book value of assets instead of the
cumulative cost of stock repurchases is emphasize the role of the economic
significance of prior gains and losses on future stock repurchasing activity.
Two firms with identical dollar losses and cumulative costs of stock
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repurchases but of different firm sizes may react differently. For example they
may both have a loss of $1million dollars and a cumulative cost of $2 million
resulting in a return of -50% each but if one has a firm size of $1 billion and
the other $100 million the REPO_RET will be -0.001 and -0.01 respectively
and hence both firms will feel the losses differently.
Table 1 presents an example of the calculation of repurchase portfolio returns
(REPO_RET) of a firm over four years (16 quarters) assuming no stock splits. Thus
REPO_RET is the cumulative return from stock repurchases from the first time a firm
first repurchases 0.1% of its market capitalization.
The analysis and the variables in this study are based on 3 samples. The main
sample is based on COMPUSTAT; a second sample which requires tenure and age data
from EXECUCOMP; and a third sample which is used to test the dividend substitution
hypothesis. Table 2 provides summary statistics for the variables used in the study.
Table 3 provides annual statistics on repurchasing activity and dollar gains from
repurchases from 1984 to 2011. Table 3 starts by providing annual stock repurchase
initiations (the number of firms that repurchase at least 0.1 percent of the previous
quarter’s market capitalization for the first time). Next the table 3 reports the total
number of repurchasing firms in any given year. This is followed by the aggregate dollars
spent on stock repurchases and the aggregate dollar gains from repurchases respectively
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both in nominal and real terms4. The last two columns report the average dollars spent on
repurchases and the average dollar gains from repurchases.
The main finding from table 3 is that repurchasing activity and the dollar gains
tend to slow down at the onset of recessions. For example if we look at the last recession
although the number of firms initiating stock repurchases and the number of firms
conducting stock repurchases were still substantial, the dollars spent on repurchases went
from $560.189 million to $168,056 million in 2007 compared to 2009, representing a
70% decrease. The most popular reason for the slowdown in repurchasing activity
provided in the media is related to firms stock piling cash for precautionary reasons due
to the uncertain macroeconomic environment. Likewise, the aggregate dollar gains from
repurchases went from a peak of $7,515,406 million in 2007 to $2,285,522 million in
2009 which also corresponds to a 70% decrease. Could this decrease in gains from prior
stock repurchases also explain the decrease in repurchasing activity?

4. Results and Discussion
In this section we examine the impact of past repurchase returns on the decision to
repurchase new shares. In our empirical framework, we examine gains and losses
separately to allow for the possibility of an asymmetric response, which might obtain if
CEOs exhibit loss aversion. we start our analysis by computing the cumulative stock
repurchase returns from the first time a firm repurchases its shares in our sample until the
third quarter of 2011 or until a firm delists. Next we compute the stock repurchase returns
4

The real values are in 2011 dollars using GDP deflator from FRED. The base year from FRED is 2005 but
to use 2011 as the base year we divide the deflator series by the 2011 value.
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using different horizons (three year rolling windows, 5 year rolling windows, and 10 year
rolling windows). To control for the possibility that our results are not actually due to
managerial biases or loss aversion, but to some unobservable firm-level feature, we
examine cross-sectional variation in our results as a function of two CEO-level
characteristics: tenure and age and measure the cumulative stock repurchase returns over
CEO tenure in the third sub-section. Finally, we examine the relationship between prior
gains and losses from past repurchasing activity and the level of repurchases.
4.1 The impact of past repurchase returns on the decision to repurchase new shares
In this sub-section we use multivariate fixed effects logit estimators first to test
whether the probability that a firm repurchases its stock depends systematically on past
stock repurchase returns (equation 1 below). Secondly, we examine gains and losses
separately to allow for the possibility of an asymmetric response, which might obtain if
managers exhibit loss aversion in other words we test whether managers are more
sensitive to prior negative stock repurchase returns than they are to prior positive stock
repurchase returns (equation 2 below). The dependent variable, REPODUMt equals to
one in quarters where the firm repurchases at least 0.1 percent of its market capitalization.
We estimate the following multivariate fixed effects logit models:
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In both equations, i represents the firm, t represents time measured at the end of a
given quarter, and ci is an unobserved time invariant firm fix effect. We control for prior
determinants of stock repurchases found in the literature as follows:
To control for the agency hypothesis the following proxy variables are used:
•

CASHt-1: CHEQ/ ATQ: Cash and short-term investments (this represents cash
and all securities readily transferable to cash as listed in the Current Asset
section of the firm’s balance sheet) scaled by total assets and lagged by one
quarter.

•

CF t-1: OIBDPQ/ATQ: Operating income before depreciation scaled by total
assets, and lagged by one quarter.

Consistent with prior research that uses excess cash flows as a motive for share
repurchases to alleviate agency problems, we predict high levels of excess cash and cash
flows are positively related to the decision to repurchase shares, ceteris paribus.
To control for undervaluation, we use the following proxy variables:
•

SIZE t-1: LN (ATQ): is the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets lagged by
one quarter. Consistent with prior research we expect a positive relationship
between size and the decision to repurchase stock. Especially because bigger
firms are more likely to have the cash to repurchase stocks.
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•

RETt-1: Quarterly stock return is the cumulative discrete quarter stock return
based on the monthly returns from CRSP; lagged by one quarter. Consistent
with prior research (for example Stephens and Weisbach 1998), if firms
repurchase stocks to take advantage of or to signal undervaluation then we
expect a negative relationship between stock performance and the decision to
repurchase.

•

BM t-1: book-to-market ratio computed as CEQQ/marketCap, lagged by one
quarter, where CEQQ is total Common or Ordinary Equity. This can also be
used to control for a firm’s investment opportunities. Dittmar (2000) holds
while historical returns are a backward-looking measure of valuation and may
not detect current misvaluation, a firm’s book-to-market ratio may indicate a
firm’s potential for undervaluation. Thus we expect a positive relationship
between book-to-market ratio and the decision to repurchase as firms take
advantage of undervaluation.
To control for the optimal leverage hypothesis we use:

•

Lev t-1: LTQ/ATQ: Total liabilities scaled by total assets. Stock repurchases
reduce equity which increases the firm’s leverage ratio, ceteris paribus. To the
extent that firms have an optimal capital structure, firms may use stock
repurchases to achieve their target capital structure (Dittmar 2000). Thus we
expect a negative relationship between leverage and the decision to
repurchase.
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We use equation one to test whether the probability that a firm repurchases its
stock depends systematically on past stock repurchase returns. In equation one the
variable of interest is REPO_RETt-1 which is the cumulative value of all stocks a firm has
repurchased minus the dollars spent on those repurchases scaled by the end of quarter
value of total assets and lagged one quarter.
We also test for managerial loss aversion in the second equation by augmenting
the first equation with two variables: (1) LOSSt-1: an indicator which equals one if
REPO_RETt-1 is negative and zero if positive; and (2) an interaction variable
REPO_RETt-1 x LOSSt-1. If firms are more sensitive to prior losses than prior gains when
deciding to repurchase stocks then, the coefficient on REPO_RETt-1 x LOSSt-1, β9 will be
positive and significant5.
Also all explanatory variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile and
year effects are included to help control for the effect of the business cycle on stock
repurchases among other factors.
Table 4 presents the results from the logit regressions. Model 1 uses determinants
found in prior literature. Model 2 tests whether past stock repurchases returns affect the
probability that a firm repurchasing its stock while excluding prior determinants. Model 3
augments model 2 with the REPO_RETt-1 x LOSSt-1 interaction variable to test for
managerial loss aversion. Model 4 tests whether stock repurchase returns affect the
5

The regression model presented in equation 2 is piecewise since holding all other variables constant, the
coefficient on REPO_RETt-1 captures the slope in the region of positive stock repurchase returns (gains)
while the coefficient on the interaction term REPO_RETt-1 x LOSSt-1 plus that of REPO_RETt-1 is the slope
in the region of prior negative stock repurchase returns (losses). Hence the coefficient on REPO_RETt-1 x
LOSSt-1 is a kink at the origin and if positive results in a steeper slope in the domain of losses. However, the
coefficient on LOSSt-1 captures a discontinuity at the origin or kink. we do not provide an economic
interpretation of that parameter.
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probability of stock repurchases while controlling for other determinants by combining
models 1 and 2. Model 5, the main model tests whether the probability of repurchasing is
more sensitive to negative stock repurchase returns (losses) compared with past positive
stock repurchase returns (gains) while controlling for other determinant by combining
models 1 and 3. Finally an alternative to testing model 5 (if the probability of
repurchasing is more sensitive to prior losses compared to prior gains) is to split the
sample by firms that have prior gains in any given quarter versus firms with prior losses
and run model 4 on both subsamples (see model 6 and 7 respectively).
Across all models in Table 4, the prior determinants have their expected signs and
they are all statistically significant at an alpha level of 1%. The analysis provides
evidence that firms may use stock repurchases to mitigate agency problems as the
probability of repurchasing is positively related to the level of cash and cash flows
(scaled by total assets). There is also evidence of the undervaluation hypothesis as the
probability of repurchasing is positively related to the book-to-market ratio, and firm size
firm; and is negatively related to the stock return in the prior quarter. Finally leverage is
associated with a negative probability of repurchasing.
With regards to the first question: does the probability that a firm repurchases its
stock depends systematically on its cumulative returns from prior stock repurchases?
Models 2 and 4 provide evidence suggesting a positive association between past stock
repurchase returns and the probability of repurchasing new shares, ceteris paribus.
Turning to the next question: is the probability that a firm repurchases its stock
more sensitive to past losses compared to past gains? That is, is there is an asymmetry
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between prior cumulative negative and positive repurchase returns? Models 3 and 5 show
that conditioning on prior losses, an increase in prior losses is associated with a decrease
in the probability of stock repurchases (- 4.356 and – 3.202 in models 3 and 5
respectively). Conversely, given prior losses, a decrease in prior losses (if losses become
less negative) is associated with an increase in the probability of repurchasing. On the
other hand, given prior gains, an increase in gains has no significant effect on the
probability of repurchasing. These results are confirmed in model 6 where we split the
sample into firms quarters in which firms have prior accumulated gains versus prior
accumulated losses.
Taken together the results suggest that the cumulative returns from prior stock
repurchases are positively related to the probability of stock repurchases however, this
effect seems to be primarily driven by prior negative stock repurchase returns. Managers
tend to be sensitive to prior losses. These results also suggest that managers are loss
averse.
4.2 The impact of past repurchase returns on the decision to repurchase new shares over
different horizons
In the preceding analysis, returns from prior stock repurchases are measured from
the time a firm enters the sample until the third quarter of 2011 or until the firm delists. A
potential issue with measuring the repurchase returns this way is that we am assuming the
outcome of all prior stock repurchasing decisions equally affect stock repurchases at time
t which may be implausible. For example, for a firm that has repurchased stocks every
quarter since 1984 we assume that repurchases conducted in 1984 and repurchases one
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quarter ago equally influence the manager’s decision today. we address this issue in this
subsection by measuring the repurchase returns using three-, five-, and ten-year rolling
windows (REPO_RET3t-1, REPO5_RETt-1, and REPO10_RETt-1 respectively). The
rational is that most open market repurchase programs take on average 3 to 4 years to
complete and, as panel B of table 2 shows, the average CEO tenure in our sample is 5.3
years.
Table 5 presents fixed effect logit regression results for equation 2 using
REPO_RET3t-1, REPO5_RETt-1, and REPO10_RETt-1; and LOSS3t-1, LOSS5t-1, and
LOSS10t-1 respectively in lieu of REPO_RETt-1 and LOSSt-1.
Table 5 shows that given prior negative stock repurchase returns (losses), an
increase in losses is associated with a lower probability of repurchasing across all rolling
windows. On the other hand, for firms with positive stock repurchase returns (gains),
further gains tend to produce small additional probability of repurchases; at least for the
three-, and five-year rolling windows. Finally, the results in this table confirm the results
in the preceding section as managers seem to be more sensitive to negative stock
repurchase returns (losses) than positive stock repurchase returns (gains). Thus taken
together, the decision to repurchase stock is driven by managers’ sensitivity to past
losses, ceteris paribus.
4.3. The impact of past repurchase returns on the decision to repurchase new shares –
the effect of CEO characteristics
To control for the possibility that the results are not due to managerial biases or
loss aversion, but due to some unobservable firm-level feature, (1) we measure the stock
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repurchase returns over the tenure of a CEO in any given firm6; (2) we include CEO fixed
effects in the multivariate logit analysis (Bertrand and Schoar 2003 find that manager
fixed effects are related to a variety of corporate decisions including dividend policy.);
and (3) we examine cross-sectional variation in our results as a function of two CEOlevel characteristics: tenure and age. Prendergast and Stole (1996) present a model in
which individuals want to acquire a reputation for quickly learning a correct course of
action. This desire leads to two types of sub-optimal behavior: exaggeration, in which
individuals respond too much to new information; and conservatism, in which behavior is
not changed enough in the light of new information. In their model, individuals early in
their job tenure tend to respond too much, while those with longer tenure respond too
little. Drawing upon these results, we hypothesize that CEOs with the shortest tenure
will exhibit behavior that is most sensitive to realized gains and losses, while long-tenure
CEOs will be the least sensitive.
With respect to the link between age and loss aversion, Johnson et. al. (2006) find
an increasing relationship between risk aversion and age, while Hjorth and Fosgerau
(2009) find that loss aversion increases with age up to around 55 years, and then declines
rapidly. Bertrand and Schoar (2003), after controlling for fixed differences across firms
and other time varying firm factors, find that executives from earlier birth cohorts tend to
6

The rational for measuring gains and losses from repurchases based on a CEO’s tenure within the firm is
an intuitive one. To the extent that CEOs influence their firm’s payout policy what matters most to any
CEO are the gains from repurchases under their tenure and not those their predecessors. A specific CEO
may have cumulated losses which could induce that CEO to be loss averse and then a new CEO comes in
and “does their own thing.” For example Apple under Steve Jobs didn’t payout but one year after Steve
Job’s death, Apple under the new CEO, Tim Cook announced a $2.65 quarterly dividend and a three year
share repurchase program of about $45 billion. Besides the availability of excess cash some analysts
attribute these payout decision to the new CEO and hold Steve Jobs philosophy on the contrary was to
“hoard cash” and this was in part due to his “long memory” when he returned to Apple in 1997 at which
point the firm was struggling and using more cash that it could earn.
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/apple-aapl-changed-year-steve-jobsdeath/story?id=17387066#.UJ1pb4Yau4q
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be more conservative in corporate decision making. Because the majority of the CEO
sample is in the 50 to 55 years age range, it is unclear whether there is enough age
variation to find a linear relationship between loss aversion and age.
Table 6 presents CEO fixed effects logit regressions of quarterly stock repurchase
activity from 1993-2011 using the Execucomp sample. The repurchase returns
(REPO_RET_CEO) in this table are measured over the tenure of each CEO.
The first model shows that there is no evidence that returns from prior stock
repurchases have any effect on the probability to repurchase stock. However the second
model reveals that managers view losses differently from gains and that losses are what
really matter. One can see that negative repurchase returns (losses) are negatively
associated with the probability of repurchasing stocks. Also the coefficient on
REPO_RET_CEO x LOSS_RET_CEO has the biggest magnitude. Although there is also a
negative relationship between prior positive repurchase returns (gains) and the probability
of repurchasing, the is effect not to be economically significant. The results in the first
two columns are consistent with the findings in the preceding sections. Thus, regardless
of how the repurchase returns are measured, the results show that managers are more
sensitive to past losses than past gains.
The third to sixth models control for the possibility that the results are not due to
managerial biases or loss aversion, but due to some unobservable firm-level feature, by
separately controlling for CEO tenure and CEO age. The third and fourth model control
for tenure by splitting the sample into CEOs who are below median tenure and CEOs
whose tenure is greater or equal to the median, tenure and conduct the logit analysis on
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each of these sub-samples. The results are consistent with the previous analysis in that
prior negative repurchase returns are negatively associated with the probability of
repurchasing across CEOs below or above median tenure. But this sensitivity is more
pronounced in CEOs with lower tenure compared to CEOS above median tenure CEOs
(the difference between both coefficients is statistically and economically significant).
Similarly, in the fifth and sixth model, the sample is split into CEOs whose ages
are below the sample CEO median age and those whose ages are equal to or above the
sample median age respectively. Once again, the results are consistent with the previous
analysis in that prior negative repurchase returns are negatively associated with the
probability of repurchasing across CEOs below or above the sample median age. But
there is no evidence that age is a factor since the difference of coefficient on
REPO_RET_CEO x LOSS_RET_CEO across both sample are neither statistically nor
economically significant. This could be due to the fact that the majority of CEOs in our
sample are between the ages of 50 and 57.
Taken together, the results up this point can be summarized as follows: when
deciding to repurchase shares not only do managers seem to be more sensitive to losses
from prior stock repurchase programs than prior gains but the losses are what seem to
matter. We present this as evidence of managerial loss aversion. Secondly the loss
aversion that we document seems to be related to CEO tenure as tenured CEOs seem to
be less prone to loss aversion.
4.4. The impact of past repurchase returns on the level of stock repurchase
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Up until this point the focus has been to test whether there is relationship between
outcome of prior repurchasing activity and the decision to repurchase stocks in a given
quarter. The focus of this subsection is to test whether there is a relationship between past
repurchase returns and the level of stock repurchases in a given quarter. The dependent
variable in this section is the dollars spent on stock repurchases in any given quarter
scaled by the market capitalization at the end of the prior quarter. The dependent
variables are the same as in the previous subsections with Logit analysis.
Given that there are many quarters in which firms do not conduct stock
repurchases there are large clusters of zeroes in the dependent variable thus a linear
regression would be in appropriate in this instance thus we use cross-sectional Tobit
regressions, and Fama-Macbeth method to estimate the coefficients and the standard
errors. The results of the Tobit Regressions are reported in table 7.
Across all models cash, cash flows, book-to-market and size, the prior quarter’s
stock return and leverage have their expected signs and for the most part are significantly
different from zero. Table 7 also shows some evidence of loss aversion particularly in
models three and four which reveals that given losses from prior stock repurchasing
activity further increases in losses are associated with lower levels of spending on stock
repurchases. On the other hand given prior gains there is no evidence that additional
gains have any effect on the level of spending on stock repurchases. Thus taken together
we provide evidence that when deciding to repurchase shares not only do firms seem to
be more sensitive to losses from prior stock repurchase programs than prior gains but the
losses are what seem to matter (loss aversion). Secondly the loss aversion that we
document seems to be related to CEO tenure as tenured CEOs seem to be less prone to
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loss aversion. Thirdly we provide some evidence which suggests that firms are also loss
averse when deciding on how much to spend on stock repurchases.

5. Implication: The impact of past repurchase returns on the dividend-repurchase
substitution
Up to this point we provide evidence supporting the idea that the outcome of past
stock repurchasing activity as measured by the returns from past stock repurchases do
influence future stock repurchasing decisions. Particularly we find evidence of
managerial loss aversion namely that not only are managers more sensitive to prior losses
than gains, but they seem to be entirely sensitive only to prior losses. In this section, we
turn to the implications of the outcome of past stock repurchasing activities on dividend
policy.
The analysis in this section is based on Grullon and Michaelly (2002) who
compute a firm’s dividend forecast error as the diffidence between a firm’s actual
dividend payment and the expected dividend payment based on Lintner’s (1956) model.
They find a negative correlation between firms dividend forecast errors and stock
repurchase activity. This is presented as evidence of the substitution hypothesis, namely,
that funds that would otherwise be used to increases dividends are used to repurchase
stock.
We examine the role if any the outcome of prior repurchasing activity has on the
dividend forecast error. Specifically, whether the substitution hypothesis documented by
Grullon and Michaelly (2002) is weaker (stronger) for firms that repurchase their stock
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and have prior negative realized repurchase returns (positive realized repurchase returns).
We use the same methodology as Grullon and Michaelly (2002), but different preforecast
and forecast windows. Their study uses 1973 to 1983 and 1973 to 1990 as their
preforecast periods. We use 1985 to 1994 (this study begins from the period stock
repurchases begin to be a competing payout choice7 in this sample), and 1995 to 2010 as
our forecast period.
For each firm we define the forecast error as:
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Where ∆HIJ, is the actual change in dividends in year t for the i'th firm. )*K, ,
is the earnings in year t for the i’th firm (defined as total earnings before extraordinary
items – COMPUSTAT IB). HIJ, is the dividend level in year t-1 (defined as the dollar
amount of dividends declared on the common stock of a firm during the year –
COMPUSTAT DVC). #, is the market value of equity in year t-1 (defined as
market value of common stock at end of year – COMPUSTAT PRCC_C multiplied by
CSHO) . The coefficients
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estimated for each firm over the preforecast

period and are the parameters of earnings and lagged dividends, respectively, from
Lintner’s (1965) model. To enter the sample, each firm-year must have information on
the following variables: Earn, MV, Div, and RYIELD (the total expenditure on share
repurchases at time t scaled by the market value of equity at time t – 1)8. Finally each
7

From 1985, the dollars spent on repurchase start to consistently increase in my sample
To be consistent with Grullon and Michaelly (2002), stock repurchases are defined as total expenditure on
the purchase of common and preferred stocks minus any reduction in the value of the net number of
preferred stocks outstanding. (This variable is not available for banks, utilities, and insurance companies.
Therefore, these types of firms are not included in our final sample.)

8
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firm must have paid dividends continuously over the entire preforecast period of 1985 to
1994.
To examine the role of prior losses from stock repurchases on the dividend
substitution hypothesis we estimate the following cross-sectional model based on Grullon
and Michaelly (2002):
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The estimated model is a cross-sectional regression of the forecast error on the
repurchase yield, the log of firm size, return on assets, the volatility of the return on
assets, non-operating income scaled by total assets, the debt-to-total assets ratio
augmented with our loss variable (a dummy variables that equals one when the stock
repurchase return is negative and zero otherwise), and an interaction between the gain
yield and loss dummy variable. We use the Fama and Macbeth method to estimate the
coefficients and the standard errors. If firms experience losses in their portfolio of
repurchased stocks, we expect less substitution of dividends with stock repurchases as
managers may become wary of using stock repurchases and timing the market.
Conversely, if firms experience gains from stock repurchases we expect the substitution
of dividends with stock repurchases to strengthen. Thus while we expect

,

to be

negative and statistically significant we expect β0,O to be positive and statistically
significant. Table 8 reports the results with the losses from stock repurchases measured
using three -, five-, ten-year rolling windows, and over the entire forecast period of 1995
to 2010 in models one to four respectively.
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The results in table 8 show that the substitution of stock repurchases in lieu of
dividends tends to be weaker when firms experience losses from past stock repurchases.
Thus the findings are consistent with Grullon and Michaelly (2002) since the findings
suggests that firms not only finance stock repurchases with funds that otherwise would
have been used to increase dividends but less so when they have prior losses from stock
repurchase and more so if they have prior gains.

6. Conclusion
Stock repurchases are risky investments made by management on behalf of
current shareholders. There is an extensive literature which documents “rational”
motivations for managers repurchasing their firm’s stock. Where rational means stock
repurchases are used as a tool that benefits the firm’s shareholders in some way by
increasing, or at least holding constant, firm value. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner
(2008) provide anecdotal evidence of firms repurchasing their stocks at high prices prior
to the 2008 financial crisis. They question managers’ ability to time the market and ask
whether repurchasing activity will ever return to pre-2008 levels.
At odds with the notion of rationality is the recent empirical work of Bonaime et
al. (2012) who find that, on average, managers exhibit a propensity to mis-time stock
repurchases and in the process destroy significant amounts shareholder wealth. Their
results follow a line of research suggesting investment decisions may be influenced by
past returns (outcome of prior investment decisions).

32
We hypothesize that in addition to being influenced by recent returns, managerial
stock repurchases may also be influenced by the rate of return on the existing portfolio of
repurchased stock generated from prior gains and losses from stock repurchases. This is
consistent with research demonstrating that in a variety of contexts, decisions under
uncertainty can be substantially affected by the outcomes of past decisions (see for
example, Thaler 1980; Staw 1981; Arkes and Blumer 1985). Thaler and Johnson (1990)
investigate how prior gains and losses affect risk taking behavior. Based on experimental
data from Cornell undergraduate and MBA students they find increased willingness to
take risk after prior gains, which they refer to as the “house money effect”. However,
after experiencing a prior loss, individuals showed increased loss aversion and a
decreased willingness to take risk.
We begin our empirical work by calculating at the firm-level gains and losses on
repurchased stock, and examining the impact of past repurchase returns on the decision to
repurchase new shares. In this empirical work, we examine gains and losses separately to
allow for the possibility of an asymmetric response, which might obtain if managers
exhibit loss aversion (Johnson and Thaler, 1990). we find evidence of loss aversion;
specifically, that firms are unlikely to repurchase stocks when they lose money from past
stock repurchases; and almost no evidence that past gains on repurchases influence future
repurchasing activity even after controlling for variables previously shown to affect
repurchase activity (e.g. cash, cash flow, book-to-market ratio, firm size, past one-quarter
return, etc.).
To control for the possibility that the results are not due to managerial biases or
loss aversion, but due to some unobservable firm-level feature, we examine cross-
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sectional variation in our results as a function of two CEO-level characteristics: tenure
and age. We find that manager’s decreased propensity to conduct stock repurchases given
losses from prior stock repurchases (loss aversion) is more pronounced in firms whose
CEOs have shorter tenure.
We also provide some evidence suggesting that given losses from prior stock
repurchasing activity further increases in losses are associated with lower levels of
spending on stock repurchases and no evidence that additional gains have any effect on
the level of spending on stock repurchases.
Finally, we show that the “loss-aversion” effect on repurchases indirectly affects
dividend payouts. Specifically, the dividend-repurchase substitution rate slows down for
firms that experience losses in their past repurchase activities.
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Table 2
Summary statistics
This table provides summary statistics for variables used in the study. Panel A is based on the largest
sample from COMPUSTAT universe. Panel B is based on Execucomp firms, for which we can
identify the tenure of the CEO. Panel C is based on dividend-repurchase substitution sample used in
Grullon and Michaely (2002). Sample period is 1984-2011 and variables are winsorized at 1% on each
tail. REPODUMt is a dummy variable that equals one when the firm buys back stock during the quarter
and zero otherwise. CASHt-1 is one-quarter lagged cash and short-term investments scaled by total
assets (COMPUSTAT: CHEQ/ ATQ). CFt-1 is one-quarter lagged operating income before
depreciation scaled by total assets (COMPUSTAT: OIBDPQ / ATQ). BMt-1 is one-quarter lagged
book-to-market ratio. Book value is defined as total common or ordinary equity (COMPUSTAT:
CEQQ) and the market value is defined as last trading day of the quarter shares outstanding (CRSP:
SHROUT) multiplied by the closing price (CRSP: PRC). SIZEt-1 is the natural log of total assets
(COMPUSTAT: ATQ). RETt-1, is the cumulative stock return for the past quarter based on the monthly
returns from CRSP. LEVt-1 is one-quarter lagged total liabilities scaled by total assets (COMPUSTAT:
LTQ/ATQ). REPO_RET is the cumulative value of all stocks a firm has repurchased minus the dollars
spent on those repurchases (reference point) scaled by total assets. LOSS is a dummy variable that
equals one when REPO_RET is negative and zero otherwise. REPO_RET10, REPO_RET5, and
REPO_RET3 are the cumulative values of all stocks a firm has repurchased minus the dollars spent on
those repurchases (reference point) scaled by total assets using a 10 year, 5 year and 3 year rolling
window respectively. LOSS10, LOSS5 and LOSS3 are dummy variables that equal one when
REPO_RET10, REPO_RET5 and REPO_RET3 are negative respectively and zero otherwise. TENURE
is the number of quarters the CEO has spent at the firm and AGE is the CEO’s age in years.
REPO_RET_CEO is the cumulative value of all stocks a firm has repurchased under the CEO minus
the dollars spent on those repurchases (reference point) scaled by total assets. LOSS_RET_CEO is a
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dummy variable that equals one when REPO_RET_CEO is negative and zero otherwise. RYIELD is
the total expenditure on share repurchases at time t scaled by the market value of equity at time t - 1.
LOG_MV is the natural log of the market value of equity. ROA is the operating income before
depreciation scaled by the book value of the total. SIGMA_ROA is the standard deviation of ROA over
the three years surrounding the firm year observation. NOPER is the nonoperating income before
depreciation scaled by the book value of the total assets. DEBT is the book value of total long-term
debt plus the book value of total short-term debt scaled by the book value of the total assets. In the
dividend-repurchase substitution sample past accumulated returns on the repurchase portfolio is
calculated by scaling with the market value of equity to be consistent with other variables used in
Grullon and Michaely (2002). RYIELD, NOPER, and DEBT are truncated at the 99th percentile and
ROA is truncated at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Panel A: Summary statistics for the main sample
Variable
N
Mean
Std
1%
25%
50% 75%
99%
REPODUMt
222,890 0.256 0.436 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
1.000
CASHt-1
222,613 0.151 0.184 0.000 0.020 0.072 0.214
0.816
CFt-1
200,810 0.026 0.044 -0.180 0.014 0.031 0.048
0.126
BMt-1
221,797 0.687 0.611 -0.591 0.317 0.545 0.885
3.540
SIZEt-1
222,890 5.458 2.067 1.138 3.945 5.340 6.875
10.481
222,639 0.036 0.268 -0.564 -0.118 0.014 0.155
1.094
RETt-1
LEVt-1
222,852 0.491 0.235 0.060 0.313 0.490 0.643
1.210
REPO_RET
222,890 0.058 0.233 -0.553 -0.006 0.003 0.054
1.377
LOSS
222,890 0.399 0.490 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
1.000
REPO_RET10 222,890 0.029 0.150 -0.447 -0.006 0.001 0.032
0.828
LOSS10
222,890 0.409 0.492 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
1.000
REPO_RET5
222,890 0.010 0.077 -0.269 -0.003 0.000 0.012
0.418
LOSS5
222,890 0.389 0.488 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
1.000
REPO_RET3
222,890 0.005 0.040 -0.147 -0.001 0.000 0.004
0.223
LOSS3
222,890 0.348 0.476 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
1.000
1-digit SIC
0
1
2
3
4
5
7
8
9

Industry definition
Agriculture
Mining, oil and const.
Food, beverage and chemicals
Plastics, computer and machinery
Railroads and airlines
Wholesale and retail
Arts, recreations, technical services
Healthcare, professional, social assistance and education services
Public administration services
Total

Panel B: Summary statistics for the Execucomp sample
Variable
N
Mean
Std
1%
REPODUMt
80,217 0.339
0.473
0.000
CASHt-1
80,177 0.141
0.165
0.001
CFt-1
74,695 0.038
0.028 -0.059
BMt-1
79,927 0.521
0.388 -0.177
80,217 7.073
1.603
3.576
SIZEt-1
RETt-1
80,192 0.043
0.227 -0.509
LEVt-1
80,201 0.504
0.211
0.082
TENURE
80,217 21.249 17.486 1.000
AGE
79,948 53.520 7.853 37.000
REPO_RET_CEO 80,217 0.043
0.139 -0.256

25%
0.000
0.021
0.024
0.271
5.925
-0.089
0.354
8.000
48.000
0.000

50%
0.000
0.071
0.037
0.437
6.947
0.031
0.512
17.000
53.000
0.001

75%
1.000
0.204
0.053
0.668
8.099
0.155
0.640
30.000
58.000
0.036

N
875
14,525
43,023
79,832
12,803
29,032
31,203
10,230
1,367
222,890

99%
1.000
0.713
0.128
2.216
11.199
0.852
1.114
80.000
76.000
0.827
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LOSS_RET_CEO
1-digit SIC
0
1
2
3
4
5
7
8
9

80,217

0.285

0.452

0.000

0.000

0.000

Industry definition
Agriculture
Mining, oil and const.
Food, beverage and chemicals
Plastics, computer and machinery
Railroads and airlines
Wholesale and retail
Arts, recreations, technical services
Healthcare, professional, social assistance and education services
Public administration services
Total

Panel C: Summary statistics for the dividend-repurchase substitution sample
Variable
N
Mean
Std
1%
25%
50%
REPODUMt
8,949 0.641 0.480
0.000
0.000
1.000
RYIELDt
8,949 0.018 0.030
0.000
0.000
0.004
LOG_MVt
8,949 7.260 1.964
2.639
5.964
7.275
ROAt
8,758 0.138 0.066
0.002
0.094
0.131
SIGMA_ROAt 8,376 0.022 0.022
0.001
0.008
0.015
NOPERt
8,945 0.006 0.010
-0.016
0.000
0.003
DEBTt
8,671 0.213 0.144
0.000
0.092
0.213
REPO_RET
8,949 0.157 0.747
-0.843
0.012
0.098
LOSS
8,949 0.162 0.368
0.000
0.000
0.000
REPO_RET10 8,949 0.030 0.245
-0.475 -0.002
0.012
LOSS10
8,949 0.278 0.448
0.000
0.000
0.000
REPO_RET5
8,949 0.007 0.100
-0.208 -0.002
0.000
LOSS5
8,949 0.321 0.467
0.000
0.000
0.000
REPO_RET3
8,949 0.004 0.060
-0.097 -0.001
0.000
LOSS3
8,949 0.304 0.460
0.000
0.000
0.000
1-digit SIC
0
1
2
3
4
5
7
8
9

1.000

75%
1.000
0.026
8.570
0.177
0.028
0.008
0.315
0.270
0.000
0.066
1.000
0.016
1.000
0.006
1.000

Industry definition
Agriculture
Mining, oil and const.
Food, beverage and chemicals
Plastics, computer and machinery
Railroads and airlines
Wholesale and retail
Arts, recreations, technical services
Healthcare, professional, social assistance and education services
Public administration services
Total

1.000
N
290
4,995
17,635
27,454
4,944
11,070
10,457
3,083
289
80,217

99%
1.000
0.140
11.881
0.331
0.102
0.041
0.568
1.491
1.000
0.533
1.000
0.220
1.000
0.112
1.000
N
40
238
2,235
2,491
1,556
1,039
451
102
50
8,202
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Table 3
Annual stock repurchases and cumulative gains from repurchasing
This table provides annual statistics on stock repurchases and the cumulative dollar gains relative to
repurchases prices (reference point) in our sample. A firm is said to repurchase its stock in a given
quarter when it repurchases at least 0.1 percent of the previous quarter’s market capitalization. # Repo
init. are the total number of firms that enter the sample for the first time. It is the number of firms that
repurchase at least 0.1 percent of the previous quarter’s market capitalization for the first time. # Repo
firms are the total number of firms that repurchased stocks at least once in any given year. Sum qtrly.
repo are the total quarterly dollars spent on repurchases in a given year in nominal dollars(where
quarterly repurchases are computed as COMPUSTAT purchase of common and preferred stock minus
and increases in preferred stock measured in millions of dollars). Sum qtrly. repo 2011$ are the total
quarterly dollars spent on repurchases in a given year are in 2011 dollars using the 2011 GDP deflator.
Sum qtrly.$ gains are quarterly cumulative dollar gains/losses in repurchases relative to repurchase
prices (reference point) measured in millions of dollars. Sum qtrly. $ gains 2011$ are quarterly
cumulative dollar gains/losses in repurchases relative to repurchase prices (reference point) measured
in 2011 dollars using the 2011 GDP deflator. Avg. qtrly. repo and Avg. qtrly. $ gains are the average
quarterly dollars spent on repurchases and average quarterly cumulative dollar gains/losses in
repurchases relative to repurchase prices in a given year respectively. Recession years are shaded and
are from the NBER (http://www.nber.org/cycles/). The first recession in the sample began in 3rd
quarter of 1990 through the first quarter of 1991. The second recession spanned the first quarter of
2001 to the 4th quarter. The last recession spanned the 4th quarter of 2007 to the 2nd quarter of 2009.
GDP deflator data are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
(http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPDEF/downloaddata?cid=21)
#
#
Sum qtrly. Sum
Sum qtrly.
Sum qtrly. Avg.
Avg. qtrly.
Year
Repo. Repo. repo. ($
qtrly.
$ gains ($
$ gains
qtrly.
$ gains ($
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1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Init.

firms

millions)

627
509
338
558
303
166
205
113
151
166
188
225
281
311
474
317
225
212
180
103
102
107
86
128
167
68
68
82

627
936
924
1323
1253
994
1090
899
795
853
962
1100
1246
1405
1819
1845
1649
1412
1250
1142
1025
1117
1191
1293
1437
985
1058
1143

13,360
38,568
24,707
40,072
39,677
41,762
36,746
21,264
25,523
30,240
36,240
62,854
74,519
110,499
141,711
153,548
153,639
130,471
123,401
137,059
195,751
322,241
442,080
560,189
430,507
168,056
278,853
355,887

repo.
2011$
($
millions)
25,186
70,747
44,304
69,703
66,556
67,698
57,190
32,075
37,679
43,690
51,267
87,166
101,471
148,086
187,854
200,475
195,790
163,013
151,420
164,768
227,978
362,592
483,667
597,003
448,968
174,476
284,320
355,887

millions)

-3
11,245
43,148
142,470
121,626
242,637
233,849
425,917
556,412
708,961
728,550
1,173,877
1,781,840
2,769,400
3,769,418
4,592,154
4,790,722
3,716,220
2,924,393
3,101,653
4,387,941
4,991,193
5,720,283
7,515,406
4,430,676
2,201,430
4,970,067
5,763,260

2011$ ($
millions)

-6
20,628
77,372
247,822
204,020
393,326
363,956
642,446
821,402
1,024,276
1,030,645
1,627,918
2,426,312
3,711,429
4,996,797
5,995,600
6,105,068
4,643,116
3,588,421
3,728,703
5,110,327
5,616,189
6,258,402
8,009,299
4,620,672
2,285,522
5,067,517
5,763,260

repo. ($
millions)

13.35
10.34
5.14
6.69
5.37
5.54
4.81
2.72
3.23
3.68
4.25
7.05
7.94
11.12
13.52
13.96
14.28
12.54
12.01
13.56
19.98
33.62
47.29
62.25
48.16
19.1
32.9
54.35

millions)

0
3.03
9.06
23.99
16.58
32.42
30.83
55.01
71.18
87.16
86.22
132.84
191.29
281.39
363.35
422.58
450.98
363.2
289.8
313.84
458.27
531.43
621.77
845.76
499.68
252.23
589.08
880.83
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Table 5
The impact of past repurchase returns on the decision to repurchase new shares
Past returns are cumulated over different horizons
This table presents firm fixed effects logit regressions on quarterly stock repurchase activity from
1984-2011 using alternative horizons for past returns. The dependent variable is REPODUMt that
equals one when the firm buys back stock during the quarter and zero otherwise. CASHt-1 is onequarter lagged cash and short-term investments scaled by total assets (COMPUSTAT: CHEQ/ ATQ).
CFt-1 is one-quarter lagged operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets
(COMPUSTAT: OIBDPQ / ATQ). BMt-1 is one-quarter lagged book-to-market ratio. Book value is
defined as total common or ordinary equity (COMPUSTAT: CEQQ) and the market value is defined
as last trading day of the quarter shares outstanding (CRSP: SHROUT) multiplied by the closing price
(CRSP: PRC). SIZEt-1 is the natural log of total assets (COMPUSTAT: ATQ). RETt-1, is the cumulative
stock return for the past quarter based on the monthly returns from CRSP. LEVt-1 is one-quarter lagged
total liabilities scaled by total assets (COMPUSTAT: LTQ/ATQ). REPO_RET10, REPO_RET5, and
REPO_RET3 are the cumulative values of all stocks a firm has repurchased minus the dollars spent on
those repurchases (reference point) scaled by total assets using a 10 year, 5 year and 3 year rolling
window respectively. LOSS10, LOSS5 and LOSS3 are dummy variables that equal one when
REPO_RET10, REPO_RET5 and REPO_RET3 are negative respectively and zero otherwise. Variables
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are winsorized at 1% on each tail. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively.
Dependent variable = REPO_DUMt
Hypotheses

Variables

Agency

CASHt-1 (+)
CFt-1 (+)
BMt-1 (+)
SIZEt-1 (+)
RETt-1 (-)
LEVt-1 (-)
REPO_RET3
LOSS3
REPO_RET3 x LOSS3
REPO_RET5
LOSS5
REPO_RET5 x LOSS5
REPO_RET10
LOSS10
REPO_RET10 x LOSS10

Undervaluation

Leverage
Loss aversion

Firm effects
Year effects
Pseudo-R2
N
# REPO_DUMt=1
# firms

[1]
1.194***
5.455***
0.087***
0.270***
-0.459***
-2.211***
2.117***
0.445***
2.451***

[2]
1.210***
5.221***
0.118***
0.257***
-0.548***
-2.121***

[3]
1.235***
4.861***
0.169***
0.212***
-0.623***
-1.992***

0.315***
0.279***
3.842***
-0.108*
0.138***
3.546***
Included
Included
0.0383
199,660
51,197
4,859

Included
Included
0.0367
199,660
51,197
4,859

Included
Included
0.0369
199,660
51,197
4,859
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Table 7
Tobit Regression Analysis on the Intensity of Stock Repurchases
This table presents Tobit regression analysis on quarterly stock repurchase activity from 1984-2011.
The dependent variable across all models is the dollars spent on the repurchase of common stock in
any given quarter scaled by the market capitalization at the end of the prior quarter (REPOt). CASHt-1 is
one-quarter lagged cash and short-term investments scaled by total assets (COMPUSTAT: CHEQ/
ATQ). CFt-1 is one-quarter lagged operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets
(COMPUSTAT: OIBDPQ / ATQ). BMt-1 is one-quarter lagged book-to-market ratio. Book value is
defined as total common or ordinary equity (COMPUSTAT: CEQQ) and the market value is defined
as last trading day of the quarter shares outstanding (CRSP: SHROUT) multiplied by the closing price
(CRSP: PRC). SIZEt-1 is the natural log of total assets (COMPUSTAT: ATQ). RETt-1, is the cumulative
stock return for the past quarter based on the monthly returns from CRSP. LEVt-1 is one-quarter lagged
total liabilities scaled by total assets (COMPUSTAT: LTQ/ATQ). REPO_RET is the cumulative value
of all stocks a firm has repurchased minus the dollars spent on those repurchases (reference point)
scaled by lagged market value of equity. LOSS is a dummy variable that equals one when REPO_RET
is negative and zero otherwise. REPO_RET10, REPO_RET5, and REPO_RET3 are the cumulative
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values of all stocks a firm has repurchased minus the dollars spent on those repurchases (reference
point) scaled by the lagged market value of equity using a 10-year, 5-year and 3-year rolling window
respectively. LOSS10, LOSS5 and LOSS3 are dummy variables that equal one when REPO_RET10,
REPO_RET5 and REPO_RET3 are negative respectively and zero otherwise. REPO_RET_CEO is the
cumulative value of all stocks a firm has repurchased under the CEO minus the dollars spent on those
repurchases (reference point) scaled by total assets. LOSS_RET_CEO is a dummy variable that equals
one when REPO_RET_CEO is negative and zero otherwise. Coefficients are estimated based on two
stage Fama-MacBeth regressions. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively.
Dependent variable = REPOt
Hyp.

Agency
Underval

Variables

INTERCEPT
CASHt-1 (+)
CFt-1 (+)
BMt-1 (+)
SIZEt-1 (+)

Leverage
Loss
aversion

RETt-1 (-)
LEVt-1 (-)
REPO_RET3
LOSS3
REPO_RET3 x
LOSS3
REPO_RET5
LOSS5
REPO_RET5 x
LOSS5
REPO_RET10
LOSS10
REPO_RET10 x
LOSS10
REPO_RET
LOSS
REPO_RET3 x
LOSS
REPO_RET_CEO
LOSS_RET_CEO
REPO_RET_CEO x
LOSS_RET_CEO

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

-8.01***
2.56***
19.32***
0.62***

-7.87***
2.68***
18.98***
0.67***

-7.58***
2.98***
18.42***
0.78***

-4.19***
0.65***
13.65***
-0.10

0.61***
-0.20
-2.08***

0.61***
-0.54**
-2.07***

-7.69***
2.86***
18.25***
0.77***
0.60
***
-0.81***
-1.91***

0.58***
-0.83***
-1.82***

0.37***
-0.10
-1.32***

-3211.40
1.39***
-0.30
-3220.20
0.70***
8.40
-3223.90
0.10
11.85*
-3225.10
-0.06
13.47**
2.34***
0.72***
0.80
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Table 8
The impact of past repurchase returns on the dividend-repurchase substitution
The dependent variable is dividend forecast error (ERRORi,t) computed for the forecasting period of
1995-2010 consistent with Grullon and Michaely. ERRORt is defined as:
ERRORi,t =

∆Divi,t − ( β1,i + β 2,i Earni,t + β 3,i Divi,t −1 )
MVi,t −1

where ∆Divi,t is the actual change in dividends in year t; Earni, t is the earnings in year t; Divi,t is the
dividend level in year t-1, and MVi, t-1 is the market value of equity in year t-1. β1, i β2, i and β3,i are
estimated for each firm (denoted by i) over the preforecast period based on Lintner’s (1965) model. To
be included in the sample, each firm must have paid dividends continuously over the entire preforecast
period of 1985 to 1994. To eliminate the effect of outliers forecast errors with absolute values greater
than 5% are eliminated. RYIELD is the total expenditure on share repurchases at time t scaled by the
market value of equity at time t - 1. LOG_MV is the natural log of the market value of equity. ROA is
the operating income before depreciation scaled by the book value of the total. SIGMA_ROA is the
standard deviation of ROA over the three years surrounding the firm year observation. NOPER is the
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nonoperating income before depreciation scaled by the book value of the total assets. DEBT is the
book value of total long-term debt plus the book value of total short-term debt scaled by the book value
of the total assets. REPO_RET is the cumulative value of all stocks a firm has repurchased minus the
dollars spent on those repurchases (reference point) scaled by lagged market value of equity. LOSS is a
dummy variable that equals one when REPO_RET is negative and zero otherwise. REPO_RET10,
REPO_RET5, and REPO_RET3 are the cumulative values of all stocks a firm has repurchased minus
the dollars spent on those repurchases (reference point) scaled by the lagged market value of equity
using a 10-year, 5-year and 3-year rolling window respectively. LOSS10, LOSS5 and LOSS3 are
dummy variables that equal one when REPO_RET10, REPO_RET5 and REPO_RET3 are negative
respectively and zero otherwise. Coefficients are estimated based on two stage Fama-MacBeth
regressions. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Dependent variable = ERRORt
Variables
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
Intercept
RYIELDt
LOG_MVt
ROAt
SIGMA_ROAt
NOPERt
DEBTt
LOSS3
RYIELDt x LOSS3
LOSS5
RYIELDt x LOSS5
LOSS10
RYIELDt x LOSS10
LOSS
RYIELDt x LOSS
N
# firms

-0.00132*
-0.02659***
0.00030***
0.00153
-0.00367
-0.01772*
-0.00377***
-0.00003
0.00894

-0.00111
-0.02831***
0.00029***
0.00131
-0.00301
-0.01711*
-0.00362***

-0.00038
-0.03203***
0.00023**
0.00024
-0.00033
-0.01709
-0.00324***

0.00005
-0.02850***
0.00018**
-0.00084
0.00159
-0.01740
-0.00299***

-0.00065**
0.02088*
-0.00198***
0.03690***
-0.00339***
0.05058***
16
800

16
800

16
800

16
800

Essay 2
Does Past Performance of Insider Trading Affect Future Insider Trading Activity?
1. Introduction
This paper examines the relation between insider (officers and directors) open
market transactions and the outcome of past insider trading to better understand what
motivates insiders to trade. The primary goal of this paper is to test if insider trading
experiences (as measured by insider trading returns) have any effect on open market
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purchases made by insiders. If yes, are insiders more sensitive to prior losses than they
are to prior gains (loss aversion) and to the extent that insiders exhibit loss aversion when
conducting open market purchases, we examine the economic impact of insider loss
aversion on insider wealth.
There is an extant literature documenting that insiders earn abnormal returns (e.g.
Lorie and Niederhoffer 1968, Seyhun 1986, Rozeff and Zaman 1988, Lakonishok and
Lee 2001, and Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser) which can be attributed to insiders’ ability
to recognize if their firm’s stock is mispriced and also because they are privy to superior
information about their firm’s future performance. Despite these advantages, insider
trading is still a risky proposition first because insiders stand to lose wealth if their
opinion about the intrinsic value of the firm turns out to be wrong. Also insiders tend to
have a significant amount of their wealth invested in their firm (both financial and human
capital) and by purchasing additional shares they are de-diversifying their wealth and
foregoing liquidity.
We hypothesize that in addition to being influenced by the perceived misvaluation
of their firm’s securities and having superior information about their firm’s future
prospects, open market purchases by insiders may also be influenced by gains and losses
on their existing portfolio of shares held (which would capture the outcome of their past
open market transactions). This is consistent with research demonstrating that in a
variety of contexts decisions under uncertainty can be substantially affected by the
outcomes of past decisions (see for example, Thaler 1980; Staw 1981; Arkes and Blumer
1985). Thaler and Johnson (1990) investigate how prior gains and losses affect risk
taking behavior and find based on experimental data from Cornell undergraduate and
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MBA students an increased willingness to take risk after prior gains, which they refer to
as the “house money effect”. However, after experiencing a prior loss, individuals
showed increased loss aversion and reduced willingness to take risk.
If past gains and losses influence open market purchasing activity, then including
only recent stock returns and controlling for superior information at the disposal of
insiders in one’s model may fail to capture this effect. This is because purchases are not
made smoothly, and thus the gains and losses on the portfolio are affected both by past
returns, and the timing of the cash flows used to purchase stock. We begin the empirical
work by calculating at the firm-level insider trading returns (using the Modified Dietz
method), and examining their impact on open market purchasing activity. In this
empirical work, we examine gains and losses separately to allow for the possibility of an
asymmetric response, which might obtain if insiders exhibit loss aversion (Johnson and
Thaler, 1990).
We find insider trading returns to be positively related to insider purchase ratios
even after controlling for variables previously shown to affect purchasing activity.
However, this effect seems to be primarily driven by negative insider trading returns as
conditioning on losses; an increase in insider trading losses is associated with decreased
insider purchases while given gains from insider trading, an increase in gains has no
significant effect on insider purchase ratios. Thus the findings suggest that insider loss
aversion plays a role when insiders conduct open market purchases. We also find that
loss aversion is more pronounced with directors compared to officers.
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Finally we examine the economic impact of insider loss aversion by identify a
subsample of insiders who have losses and are predicted not to purchase due to loss
aversion. Then we spilt this subsample into two groups (1) one group that acts upon their
loss aversion by not purchasing and (2) a second group with insiders predicted to be loss
averse but decide to ignore their loss aversion by actually purchasing. We find that
having inside information about poor future stock performance and acting on loss
aversion by not purchasing the firm’s stock today (the first group) helps such insiders to
avoid an average loss of 5.7% over the next year. On the other hand, having inside
information about good future stock performance and ignoring to act upon loss aversion
by actually purchasing the firm’s stock today despite insider trading losses (the second
group) helps such insiders to earn an average of 8.14% the following year.
The findings in this study contribute to the literature in several ways. First this
study helps us better understand why insiders engage in open market purchases. In
addition to possessing superior information about their firm’s future performance, poor
timing decreases the intensity of open market purchases made by insiders as they are loss
averse. Secondly this is the first study to document a link between loss aversion and
insider trading thus suggesting that insider biases may affect insider trading behavior.
Finally, the findings in this study confirms the existing literature that insiders have
superior knowledge about their firm’s future prospect since acting upon loss aversion
when the firm’s future prospects are less favorable helps insiders avoid a loss and
ignoring loss aversion in situations of losses but favorable future prospects helps insiders
enhance their wealth.
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The study proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on the
motives of insider trading and develops the hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data used
in the study. Section 4 presents the tests of the main hypothesis while section 5 provides
the economic impact of insider loss aversion on insider wealth. Section 6 concludes.

2. Literature Review and Motivation
2.1. Determinants of Insider Trading
This section provides a brief overview of the literature on the determinants of
insider trading, which we organize into the following broad categories: stock price
misvaluation, superior information about the firm’s future performance, stock based
compensation changes, and the demand by institutional and individual investors.
2.1.1. Stock Price Misvaluation
There is an extant literature which documents that insiders earn abnormal returns
(e.g. Lorie and Niederhoffer 1968, Seyhun 1986, Rozeff and Zaman 1988, Lakonishok
and Lee 2001, and Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser). Such returns can partially be achieved
if insiders recognize mispricing. According to this motive, insiders would purchase (sell)
their firm’s security if they believe the security is undervalued (overvalued). In this vein
Seyhun (1986) shows insider purchases tend to occur after stock price declines and
insider sell trades tend to occur after stock price rises.
Similarly Rozeff and Zaman (1998) find evidence suggesting that insiders tend to
buy undervalued stocks. The authors look at the direction of insider trading with respect
to growth/value stocks and test if they are consistent with attempts to profit from market
overreaction (price movements that predictably reverse). Rozeff and Zaman (1998) posit
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if we assume that value stocks are undervalued and growth stocks are overvalued and /or
provide profit opportunities to some investor then insiders who supposedly have superior
information have the incentive to take advantage of such misvaluations within the bounds
of legality by buying value stock more heavily and /or selling growth stock more heavily.
But on the other hand, if growth and value stocks don’t meaningfully measure deviations
of stock prices from fundamental values then insider trades shouldn’t be related to these
categories. They find that as stocks increasingly move from value stocks to growth stocks
there is an increase in insider purchasing activity compared to insider selling. Thus
suggesting that the price of value stocks tend to be below intrinsic value while that of
growth stocks above intrinsic value. They also find an increase in insider buying (selling)
following low stock returns (high stock returns).
In the same vein, Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) find insiders to be contrarian
specifically, they find a positive relationship between insider trading (purchases) and the
firm’s book-to-market value and a negative relationship between insider trading and
recent stock returns. Both of these variables are used as measures of undervaluation.
Similarly, Jenter (2005) finds insiders’ perceived misvaluation of their stock is a motive
for insider trading (insider purchasing is increasing in firms with low market-to-book
values).
2.1.2. Superior Information about Firm’s Future Performance
In addition to recognizing mispricing, it has been documented that insiders’
abnormal returns from trading their firms’ stock can be attributed to having an
informational advantage about the firm’s future performance (cash flow realizations and
future earnings innovations). Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) use next year’s annual
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earnings innovation and next year’s market-adjusted stock returns as measures of future
unexpected cash flow changes unknown by the market but known by insiders. The
authors find a positive relationship between these proxy variables and insiders’ open
market purchasing activity. Similarly, Ke, Huddart, and Petroni (2003) examine insidertrading patterns ahead of a break in quarterly earnings increases and find insider sales
increase three to nine quarters before the earnings break. They use this as evidence
suggesting that insiders trade ahead of earnings breaks, and avoid abnormal selling two
quarters prior to the break to avoid potential legal issues.
2.1.3. Stock Based Compensation Changes
Ofek and Yermack (2000) show that insider trading is influenced by the changes
in insider holdings due to stock and option grants and the exercising of stock options (For
example, increased equity compensation to higher-ownership managers leads to the sale
of previously owned shares). To this extent, Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) find an
inverse relationship between insider purchasing activity and number of shares of
restricted stock and stock options granted and number of stock options exercised.
2.1.4. Demand by Institutional and Individual Investors
Sias and Whidbee (2010) examine the relationship between insider trading and
institutional and individual investors as a motive for insider trading. The authors
hypothesize and find a negative association between inside trading and institutional
demand and offer three possible explanations. First, since insider trades are usually large,
institutional investors are more likely to provide the liquidity necessary for insiders to
trade. Secondly, institutional investors are attracted to firms with high valuations and
high recent stock return while insiders are attracted to the opposite. Finally, since insiders
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are more likely to view their securities as overvalued (undervalued) following a period
when institutions were net buyers (sellers) insiders will trade in the opposite direction of
institutional investors.
2.2. The Effect of Insider Trading Returns (Gain and Losses) on Risk Taking Behavior
The literature discussed above captures what we will label “rational” motivations
for insider trading. By rational we simply mean that in each of the cited papers, insider
trading is conducted to benefit the insider in some way by increasing their wealth.
There is an extant literature documenting that insiders earn abnormal returns (e.g.
Lorie and Niederhoffer 1968, Seyhun 1986, Rozeff and Zaman 1988, Lakonishok and
Lee 2001, and Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser) which can be attributed to insiders’ ability
to recognize if their firm’s stock is mispriced and also because they are privy to superior
information about their firm’s future performance. Despite these advantages insider
trading is still a risky proposition first because insiders stand to lose wealth if their
opinion about the intrinsic value of the firm turns out to be wrong. Also insiders tend to
have a significant amount of their wealth invested in their firm (both financial and human
capital) and by purchasing additional shares they are de-diversifying their wealth and
foregoing liquidity.
There is also a line of research suggesting investment decisions may be influenced
by past returns. For instance, Ippolito (1992) shows inflows to mutual funds are strongly
correlated with past fund performance. Empirical work by Friesen and Sapp (2007),
Frazzini and Lamont (2008) and Dichev (2007) indicates that poor investment-timing
decisions, in which investors buy after past gains and sell after past losses, destroy a
significant percentage of investor wealth.
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We hypothesize that in addition to being influenced by the perceived misvaluation
of their firm’s securities and having superior information about their firm’s future
prospects, open market purchases by insiders may also be influenced by gains and losses
on their existing portfolio of shares held (which would capture the outcome of their past
open market transactions). This is consistent with research demonstrating that in a
variety of contexts decisions under uncertainty can be substantially affected by the
outcomes of past decisions (see for example, Thaler 1980; Staw 1981; Arkes and Blumer
1985). Thaler and Johnson (1990) investigate how prior gains and losses affect risk
taking behavior and find based on experimental data from Cornell undergraduate and
MBA students an increased willingness to take risk after prior gains, which they refer to
as the “house money effect”. However, after experiencing a prior loss, individuals
showed increased loss aversion, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as the “snakebite
effect”. Their results suggest that losses are more painful if they happen after prior losses
and less painful if they occur after prior gains, since prior gains act as cushions for future
losses. Frino, Grant and Johnstone (2007) examine Australian futures traders and find
supporting evidence, that traders take on more risk in the afternoon on days with morning
gains. Low (2004) finds that prior losses are associated with increased loss aversion,
which is consistent with the snakebite effect. However, the evidence on the effect of
past gains and losses is mixed. Coval and Shumway (2005) find that traders with
morning losses increase risk-taking in the afternoon.
Regardless of the precise nature of the relationship, if past gains and losses
influence open market purchasing activity, then including only recent stock returns and
controlling for superior information at the disposal of insiders in one’s model may fail to
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capture this effect. This is because purchases are not made smoothly, and thus the gains
and losses on the portfolio are affected both by past returns, and the timing of the cash
flows used to purchase stock. We begin the empirical work by calculating at the firmlevel insider trading returns, and examining their purchasing activity. In this empirical
work, we examine gains and losses separately to allow for the possibility of an
asymmetric response, which might obtain if insiders exhibit loss aversion (Johnson and
Thaler, 1990).
Finally, to the extent that insiders exhibit loss aversion when conducting open
market purchases, we examine the economic impact of insider loss aversion on insider
wealth.

3. Data and Sample Construction
The analysis in this study focuses on open market purchases and sales by directors
and officers from Table 2 of Thomson Reuters (TFN) spanning 1986 to 2012. We impose
the following screens on table 2 data: delete amendments and some cleansed
observations9; keep transaction codes P and S as they are open market or private purchase
and sales; ignore sales that are related to the exercise of an option10; and we keep
transactions in firms for which we have COMPUSTAT and CRSP necessary to generate

9

Thomson advises Cleanse Code (A) to be avoided from analysis. And also code (S) since data with a
cleanse code of 'S' have a different security from the one they have been entered under
10
The variable optionSell: Identifies a sale that is related to the exercise of options. Possible values include
all (A), partial (P), none (N), or blank. We want open market sale of shares that were purchased for their
account and not those that arose from option grants so we keep (N) and ignore (A) and (P) and Blanks
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control variables. This results in 1,682,374 transactions over 27 years of which 442,882
(26%) are purchases and 1,239,492 (74%) are sales with 124,009 insiders11.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the number of shares purchased and sold;
transaction values; and shares held after each transaction. The typical number of shares
purchased is larger than the number of shares sold (with an average of 19,701 shares
versus 16,650) however; the typical dollar transaction value for purchases is smaller than
the sales value (with an average dollar value of $140,131 per purchase versus $469,564
per sale).
Table 2 reports the distribution and frequencies of insider transactions. From table
two, 61 percent of insiders (76,026 insiders out 124,009) have one or zero purchase
transactions which is similar for sales (76,159 insiders out of 124,009). From panel B of
table 2, the average number of purchase transactions made by an insider is 4 compared to
10 for sales.
3.1. Measurement of Insider Trading Behavior
Following Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) we measure insider trading as the
firm’s purchase ratio defined as follows:

, 

QRS7,8
QRS7,8 <T>UU7,8

,

eq.1

where V', ("", ) is the number of shared purchased (sold) by insiders (officers and
directors) of the i'th firm in year t.

11

Some individuals are insiders in more than 1 firm. This number is the sum of insiders in any given firm
and thus allows for some individuals to show up multiple times if they are insiders in more than 1 firm.
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3.2. Measurement of Insider Trading returns
The primary goal of this paper is to test if the outcome of past insider trading
(insider trading experience) as measure by insider trading returns (InsiderRett) have any
effect on open market insider purchases. If yes, are insiders more sensitive to prior losses
than they are to prior gains. The main variable, InsiderRett is constructed as follows:
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eq. 2

Where:
•

# is the end of year market value of the portfolio of all shares held by insiders
in the i’th firm. Computed as the number of shares held by all insiders at the end
of the year multiplied by the closing stock price of the year.

•

#j is the beginning of year market value of the portfolio of all shares held by
insiders in the i’th firm. Computed as the number of shares held by all insiders at
the beginning of the year multiplied by the opening stock price of the year.

•

 is the net external inflows over year t made by insiders of the i'th firm. It is
computed as total dollars spent on purchases minus the total dollars received from
sales (Note contributions to portfolio are positive inflows and withdrawals form
portfolio are negative flows)

•

∑Al k g  is the sum each cash flow multiplied by its weight:
o k 
o

b557
b5

H is the number of calendar days during the return period being
calculated (we use 365)

eq.3
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o H is the number of days from the start of the return period until the day on
which the flow  occurred. For example, if a purchase occurs on
January 31 then it is 31 days, if on February 2nd then it is 33 days.
The above return, K-IW(*(,, is the Modified Dietz (see Dietz 1966) return and
is an approximation of the IRR (the true dollar weighted return)12. The modified Dietz
return has the advantage of having a closed form solution versus the IRR which requires
numerical methods. Our choice of the Modified Dietz over the IRR is motivated by
following reasons. First when computing the IRRs we had a convergence rate of about
70% thus we lose a significant amount of data. Secondly, in most cases we have more
than one IRR due to the sign switches in the cash flows. In such cases the SAS IRR
function reports one IRR and we are not sure which of the IRRs is reported. Even if we
knew all the IRRs it is not sure which one of then we would use. This issue is
exacerbated the more trades we have and/or the longer the period over which the IRR is
computed. Finally, computing the “true” IRR requires that we have the correct initial
value of an insider’s portfolio but TFN begins in 1986 thus for some insiders we do not
have their actual initial portfolio value. But with the Modified Dietz we need the
beginning and ending value of the portfolio over the period for which we are computing
the return.
A potential issue with the Modified Dietz return (K-IW(*(,, ) in this study is
that some of the shares held in the insiders’ portfolio may have resulted from other
sources than open market purchases especially from the exercise of options. To control
12

The Modified Dietz return assumes simple rate of interest and approximates the IRR which uses
compounding principle. If the cash flows and rates of return are large enough, Modified Dietz would yield
significantly different returns compared to the IRR.
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for this we ignore sales that are related to the exercise of an option13. This may just take
care of cases where the options are sold immediately and may not capture options that are
exercised and sold at a later date (either because the insider has some insider information
or the shares are held for some mechanical reason). We argue that such transactions will
not bias the results in this study. First if the insider holds on to the shares because they
have some inside information then they are making a conscious decision to increase their
insider trading return. Secondly if they hold the shares for some mechanical reason we
posit that such transactions are timing neutral and while they may add noise to results
they will not bias the results. Finally, the number of such transactions should be small as
Ofek and Yermack (2000) estimate that when executives exercise options to acquire
stock, they keep almost none of the shares (see page 1376). Similarly Huddart, and Lang
(1996) hold that while their data doesn’t detail the ultimate disposition of options in their
sample, the authors’ discussions with the data providers suggests that employees do not
keep the shares acquired on exercise (page 19).
Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser (2003) attempt to measure insiders actual return by
creating a purchase (sale) value-weighted portfolio of all insiders for the duration of 6
months since the purchase (sale). However, they do not exactly measure what insiders
earn for several reasons: they only measure returns over a holding of 6 months, and they
do not account for subsequent trades that insiders may execute.
3.3. Control Variables

13

TFN has a variable called optionSell which dentifies a sale that is related to the exercise of options.
Possible values include all (A), partial (P), none (N), or blank. We want open market sale of shares that
were purchased for their account and not those that arose from option grants so we keep (N) and ignore (A)
and (P) and Blanks
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In addition to insider trading data we collect a set of control variables used by
Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) to explain insider purchasing activity. This allows us to
compare our results to previous studies (e.g. Rozeff and Zaman 1988, and Sias and
Whidbee 2010). We require securities to have Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) variables
to be included in our sample. The following control variables are used in the study
•

Measurements of future firm performance:
o GoodRet(t+1) : Is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the stock’s next year’s
market adjusted return (MaRet(t+1)) is greater than zero else equal to zero.
This is a measure of the firm’s future performance and measures the
insiders’ potential gain from trading the firm’s stock as opposed to the
market portfolio. To the extent that insiders have superior knowledge
about information influencing future returns, it should be positively related
to insider purchases. Stock return data are from CRSP.
o GoodRoA(t+1) : Is an indicator variable equal to one if next year’s change
in ROA (∆ROA(t+1)) is greater than zero else equals to zero. This is also a
measure of the firm’s future performance (next year’s earnings
innovations) and it is expected to be positively related to insider
purchases. Where ∆ROA(t+1) is the next year’s first difference in Returnon-Assets (ROA(t+1) - ROA(t)) and ROA is COMPUSTAT’s Income before
Extraordinary items (IB) scaled by COMPUSTAT’s total assets (AT)
o GoodRoA(t) : Is an indicator variable equal to one if the current year’s
change in ROA (∆ROA(t)) is greater than zero else equals to zero.
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•

Measurements of undervaluation :
o BM1t to BM4t : Is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the book-to-market
(BM) ratio is in the i’th quintile of year t’s BM distribution (e.g.
BM1=glamour firms). Where the BM is measured as the firm’s book
value of shareholders equity (COMPUSTAT’s CEQ) at the end of year
scaled by the market value of equity at the end of year t (COMPUSTAT’s
CSHO multiplied by the stock’s closing stock price at the end of year from
CRSP).
o HRet and Mret: Is an indicator variable equal to 1 if market adjusted stock
return is in the high trecile and middle trecile respectively of year t’s
distribution of realized market adjusted returns.
Table three presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study pooled

over all firm-year observations. Although our sample is longer than Piotroski and
Roulstone (2005) and Sias and Whidbee (2010) the descriptive statistics are close. The
last six rows in table three report descriptive statistics of the insider trading returns for all
insiders, directors only and officers only. From table three officers’ returns are on
average bigger than those of directors. Also about 59% of the time insiders have losses.

4. Results and Discussion
In this section we examine the impact of insider trading returns on open market
purchasing activity. In the empirical framework, we examine gains and losses separately
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to allow for the possibility of an asymmetric response, which might obtain if insiders
exhibit loss aversion. We start the analysis by examining the relation between insiders
purchase ratios (, ) and insider trading returns (K-IW(*(,, ). Next, given that the
board of directors is a governing body and meets periodically it follows that officers are
more likely to have superior and timely information about the firm’s future performance.
We test for equality of loss aversion across directors and officers. Finally, we examine
the relationship between insider trading returns and the decision to conduct open market
purchases.
4.1. The Relation between Insider Purchase Ratios and Insider Returns - All insiders
To test whether there is a relation between insider purchase ratios and insider
returns we utilize the methodology in Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) and augment their
variables with our insider trading returns variable (K-IW(*(,, ). Rozeff and Zaman
(1988), and Sias and Whidbee (2010) utilize a similar methodology. We restrict
transactions to open market transactions and do not include firm-years where insiders do
not engage in open market transaction. Specifically, we estimate coefficients annually
from the following cross-sectional model:
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To control for cross-sectional dependencies, the model is estimated annually and

the average annual coefficients are tested against the null of zero using standard errors
from the empirically derived distribution of the annual coefficients. Average coefficients
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are presented in panel A of table four. For robustness we estimate fixed effects regression
(with firm fixed effects and year effects) in panel B.
To test for insider loss aversion we estimate equation 5 by augmenting equation 4
with two variables: (1) LossDummyi,t, an indicator which equals one if InsiderReti,t is
negative and zero if positive; and (2) an interaction variable K-IW(*(,, g

"2--HrssI,,:
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If insiders are more sensitive to prior losses than prior gains when conducting
open market purchases then, the coefficient on K-IW(*(,, g "2--Hrss, , β12 will
be positive and significant14. Just as with equation 4, this model is estimated annually and
the average annual coefficients are tested against the null of zero using standard errors
from the empirically derived distribution of the annual coefficients. Average coefficients
are presented in panel A of table four. For robustness we estimate fixed effects regression
(with firm fixed effects and year effects) in panel B.
Table four shows that the prior determinants of insider purchases have their
expected signs and are statistically significant at an alpha level of 1% but
14

The regression model presented in equation 5 is a piecewise linear model since holding all other variables
constant, the coefficient on K-IW(*(,, captures the slope in the region of positive insider returns (gains)
while the coefficient on the interaction term K-IW(*(,, g "2--Hrss, plus that of K-IW(*(,, is
the slope in the region of negative insider returns (losses). Hence the coefficient on K-IW(*(,, g
"2--Hrss, is a kink at the origin and if positive results in a steeper slope in the domain of losses.
However, the coefficient on "2--Hrss, captures a discontinuity at the origin or kink and we do not
provide an economic interpretation of that parameter.
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for L22W%, . Insider purchase ratios are positively related to the firm’s future
performance measures (L22W

,< ,

and L22W2,< ) thus suggesting insiders have

superior knowledge about information influencing future returns and earnings
innovations and take advantage of it. Also insiders tend to purchase shares when the
firm’s shares are undervalued as there is (1) a negative relationship between insider
purchase ratios and the book-to-market quintiles and the magnitude of the book-tomarket quintiles decrease monotonically as we move from high book-to-market quintiles
to lower quintiles. (2) there is also a negative relationship between insider purchase ratios
and the market-adjusted stock return treciles and the magnitude of the coefficients also
decreases monotonically as we move from the high trecile to the medium trecile.
The second models in both panels of table four documents a positive relationship
between insider purchase ratios and insider returns. This would suggest that insiders
purchase more of their firm’s shares if they have positive experiences from insider
trading. The third models in both panels of table four shows that conditioning on losses;
an increase in insider trading losses is associated with decreased insider purchases. On
the other hand, given gains from insider trading, an increase in gains has no significant
effect on insider purchase ratios. Taken together the results suggests that insider trading
returns are positively related to the intensity of insider purchases, this effect seems to be
primarily driven by negative insider trading returns and suggest that insiders are loss
averse.
4.2. The Relation between Insider Purchase Ratios and Insider Returns – Officers versus
Directors
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The previous analysis combines officers and directors and implicitly assumes that
officers and directors have access to similar information. Given that the board of directors
is a monitoring body and meet periodically it is possible that officers have access to
better performance related information and in a timelier manner than directors. Piotroski
and Roulstone (2005) provide evidence confirming this by documenting that the
magnitude of the coefficient on L22W%,< is larger in magnitude for executives than
directors. In the same vein, Enrichetta and Sapienza (2010) compare the returns to insider
purchases (sales) of executives to that of independent directors to examine whether
directors are informed of the firm. The authors find while both executives and
independent directors in the same firm earn positive substantial abnormal returns,
executives have slightly higher returns.
Thus in this section, we test which of the two groups of insiders (directors or
officers) are more loss averse. Since officers are likely to have timelier information and
presumably better quality information than directors one could expect directors to be
more loss averse. On the other hand, officers could be more loss averse if they suffer
from myopic loss aversion a la Bernatzi and Thaler (1995). Myopic loss aversion occurs
when an investor computes gains and losses at more frequent intervals. Given that
officers spend more time at the firm and are privy to information in a timelier manner
they could suffer from myopic loss aversion if this causes them to trade more frequently
than directors who meet periodically. Thus which group of insiders is more loss averse is
an empirical issue that we address by re-estimating equation 5 for directors-only and
officers-only and comparing the coefficients on K-IW(*(,, g "2--Hrss, , in table
five.

69
Models three and four of panels A and B of table five has the results for officersonly and directors-only respectively. The analysis shows that both groups are loss averse
however loss aversion is more pronounced with the directors compared to officers. For
example, panel A has a coefficient estimate of 0.0079 on
K-IW(*(,, g "2--Hrss, for the officer-only sample versus 0.0107 for the
director-only sample and the difference is statistically significant at an alpha level of 1%.
4.3. The Relation between Insider Returns and the Decision to Purchase
The previous sections established a relationship between insider returns and the
level of insider purchases (insiders purchase ratios). We did not include firm-years where
insiders did not engage in open market transactions thus the results thus far are predicated
on insiders deciding to purchase. As a result, omission of no-trade firm-years ignores
potential useful information about the decision to purchase. In this section we examine
the relationship between insider trading returns and the decision to conduct open market
purchases with the following conditional firm fixed effects logit model with year effects:
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eq.6

The dependent variable, r* t)-(, is an indicator variable that equals one if
shares are purchased in year t else it is equal to zero. The results of the logit analysis are
in table six and are consistent with the findings in the preceding sections. The prior
determinants of insider purchases have their expected signs and are statistically
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significant at an alpha level of 1% but for L22W%, . The decision to purchase shares is
positively related to the firm’s future performance measures (L22W

,< ,

and

L22W2,<). Also, insiders tend to purchase shares when the firm’s shares are
undervalued as there is as there is a negative relationship between the decision to
purchase shares and (1) the book-to-market quintiles and (2) the market-adjusted stock
return treciles.
The second model in table six documents a positive relationship between the
decision to purchase shares and insider returns. Thus suggesting that insiders tend to
purchase their firm’s shares when they have positive experiences from insider trading.
The third model of table six shows that conditioning on losses; an increase in insider
trading losses is associated with lower probability of insider purchasing. Likewise, given
gains from insider trading, an increase in gains is also associated with a higher
probability of purchasing. However there is still evidence of loss aversion as the decision
to purchase is more sensitive to insider losses compared to gains.

5. Implication: The Economic Impact of Loss Aversion
In the preceding section we document that insider returns are positively related to
insider purchasing activity and that insiders are loss averse. In this section we examine
the economic impact of insider loss aversion, specifically if loss aversion benefits or hurts
insider wealth. We use two approaches. The first approach is to identify a subsample of
insiders who have losses and are predicted not to purchase due to loss aversion. Then we
spilt this subsample into a group that acts upon their loss aversion by not purchasing and

71
a second group that are supposedly loss averse but decide to ignore their loss aversion by
actually purchasing. Then we compare the returns of both groups. The second approach
uses a mixed logistic model to get firm specific loss aversion coefficients and forming
quartiles based on these coefficients to test the market timing ability.
5.1. Being Loss Averse and Acting upon it versus Being Loss Averse and ignoring it
In this section we examine the economic impact of loss aversion on the wealth of
insiders by:
•

Step 1: First identify a subsample of insiders who have losses and are predicted
not to purchase due to loss aversion.

•

Step 2: Split this subsample into a group that acts upon their loss aversion by not
purchasing and a second group that are supposedly loss averse but decide to
ignore their loss aversion by purchasing.

•

Step 3: compare the returns of both groups

To identify a subsample of insiders who have losses and are predicted not to
purchase due to loss aversion, we estimate two specifications of the the logit model in
equation 6 as follows:
r* t)-(,  1uv, ,
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eq.8

In equation 7 we estimate the probability of purchasing without controlling for insider
returns and loss aversion and save the predicted probabilities of purchasing. Next in
equation 8 we augment equation 7 by controlling for insider returns and loss aversion and
save the predicted probabilities of purchasing. Next we keep firm year observations with:
(1) losses, (2) whose probability of purchasing decreases once we control for loss
aversion in equation 8 and (3) they are predicted not to purchase15. We argue that the
reason these observations have a decreased probability of purchasing and are predicted
not to purchase is because they have losses and are loss averse. This results in 8,730 firmyear observations. Then we split this subsample into two groups (1) one group that
actually does not purchase which results in 3,720 firm year observations (2) a second
group that actually purchases which results in 5,010 firm year observations. The idea is
that both groups are loss averse and are predicted not to purchase due to their loss
aversion but one group actually acts upon their loss aversion by actually not purchasing
and the other group despite being loss averse and predicted not to purchase ignores the
loss aversion by actually purchasing. Next we compare the mean insider trading returns
and next year’s market adjusted stock return for both groups; the results are in table 7.
Table 7 shows that both groups have insider trading losses but those that act upon
their loss aversion are worse off (mean K-IW(*(, of -10.0501% versus -6.7995%).
The key finding is with next year’s mean market-adjusted stock return

15

The cut off probability of purchasing used is 0.69 which represents the unconditional probability of
purchasing since 33,983 firm-year observations have purchases out of 49,159.
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(x,Wy,2 x(,<). Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) hold next year’s market adjusted
stock return is a measure of the firm’s future performance and measures insiders’
potential gain from trading the firm’s stock as opposed to the market portfolio. Thus
having inside information about poor future stock performance and acting on loss
aversion by not purchasing the firm’s stock today helps such insiders to avoid an average
loss of 5.7% over the next year. On the other hand, having inside information about good
future stock performance and ignoring to act upon loss aversion by actually purchasing
the firm’s stock today despite insider trading losses helps insider to earn an average of
8.14% the following year. This finding also confirms the existing literature that insiders
have superior knowledge about their firm’s future prospect since acting upon loss
aversion when the firms future prospects are less favorable helps insiders avoid a loss and
ignoring loss aversion in situations of losses but favorable future prospects helps insiders.
5.2. Firm Specific Loss Aversion Coefficients and Insider Market Timing Ability
Another approach we use to access the economic impact of insider loss aversion
is to:
•

use the following mixed logistic model to get firm specific coefficients of
sensitivity to losses from insider trading:
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Where



is the average effect of losses which is the same for all firms and z is

the effect of losses that is unique to the i’th firm. Thus 



 z is the i'th firm’s

sensitivity to past losses; if positive this is consistent with loss aversion and if
negative it is consistent with risk seeking.
•

For each firm year observation we take the difference between that year’s dollar
weighted return (we use K-IW(*(,, is our proxy) and time weighted return (we
use that year’s stock return). If insiders are good at timing then this difference is
expected to be positive and negative if they exhibit poor timing

•

Then we form quartiles based on the loss sensitivities16generate by the mixed
model and get the mean of the difference between K-IW(*(,, and
KKr){(,, in each quartile. The first quartile has the least loss averse insiders
and the forth quartile has the most loss averse. If loss aversion is costly then we
expect the average difference between K-IW(*(,, and KKr){(,, in the
fourth quartile to be negative and that of the first quartile to be positive.

Table eight presents the results of the average difference between K-IW(*(,, and
KKr){(,, across all four quartile. The results show that the most loss averse insiders
on average tend to exhibit poor timing thus suggesting that loss aversion can be costly.
To reconcile the findings in this subsection with that of the preceding subsection,
the results from this subsection suggests that at high levels, loss aversion can destroy
wealth. However, the finding in the preceding subsection suggests that loss aversion can

16

500 out of 7,900 have negative loss coefficient thus are not loss averse but are risk seeking. These 500
firms are not included in the analysis
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help insiders avoid future losses if they have information about looming unfavorable
prospects with their firms.

6. Conclusion
There is an extant literature documenting that insiders earn abnormal returns (e.g.
Lorie and Niederhoffer 1968, Seyhun 1986, Rozeff and Zaman 1988, Lakonishok and
Lee 2001, and Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser) which can be attributed to insiders’ ability
to recognize if their firm’s stock is mispriced and also because they are privy to superior
information about their firm’s future performance. Despite these advantages, insider
trading is still a risky proposition first because insiders stand to lose wealth if their
opinion about the intrinsic value of the firm turns out to be wrong. Also insiders tend to
have a significant amount of their wealth invested in their firm (both financial and human
capital) and by purchasing additional shares they are de-diversifying their wealth and
foregoing liquidity.
We hypothesize that in addition to being influenced by the perceived misvaluation
of their firm’s securities and having superior information about their firm’s future
prospects, open market purchases by insiders may also be influenced by gains and losses
on their existing portfolio of shares held (which would capture the outcome of their past
open market transactions). This is consistent with research demonstrating that in a
variety of contexts decisions under uncertainty can be substantially affected by the
outcomes of past decisions (see for example, Thaler 1980; Staw 1981; Arkes and Blumer
1985). Thaler and Johnson (1990) investigate how prior gains and losses affect risk
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taking behavior and find based on experimental data from Cornell undergraduate and
MBA students an increased willingness to take risk after prior gains, which they refer to
as the “house money effect”. However, after experiencing a prior loss, individuals
showed increased loss aversion and reduced willingness to take risk.
We begin the empirical work by calculating at the firm-level insider trading
returns, and examining their impact on open market purchasing activity. In this empirical
work, we examine gains and losses separately to allow for the possibility of an
asymmetric response, which might obtain if insiders exhibit loss aversion (Johnson and
Thaler, 1990).
We find insider trading returns to be positively related to insider purchase ratios
even after controlling for variables previously shown to affect purchasing activity.
However, this effect seems to be primarily driven by negative insider trading returns as
conditioning on losses; an increase in insider trading losses is associated with decreased
insider purchases while given gains from insider trading, an increase in gains has no
significant effect on insider purchase ratios. Thus suggesting that insider loss aversion
plays a role when insiders conduct open market purchases. We also find that loss
aversion is more pronounced with the directors compared to officers.
Finally we examine the economic impact of insider loss aversion by identify a
subsample of insiders who have losses and are predicted not to purchase due to loss
aversion. Then we spilt this subsample into a group that acts upon their loss aversion by
not purchasing and a second group that are predicted to be loss averse but decide to
ignore their loss aversion by actually purchasing. Then we compare the returns of both
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groups. We find that having inside information about poor future stock performance and
acting on loss aversion by not purchasing the firm’s stock today helps such insiders to
avoid an average loss of 5.7% over the next year. On the other hand, having inside
information about good future stock performance and ignoring to act upon loss aversion
by actually purchasing the firm’s stock today despite insider trading losses helps insiders
to earn an average of 8.14% the following year. This confirms the existing literature that
insiders have superior knowledge about their firm’s future prospect since acting upon loss
aversion when the firms future prospects are less favorable helps insiders avoid a loss and
ignoring loss aversion in situations of losses but favorable future prospects helps insiders
enhance their wealth.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistic by Transaction Type
This table reports descriptive statistics on the number of shares purchased, the number of shares sold,
purchase transaction value, sales transaction value and the resulting number of shares held after a
transaction.
Variable
Mean
Std
5%
25%
50%
75%
99%
# Shares
19,701
1,295,999
32
300
1,000
4,000
25,000
Purchased
# Shares Sold
16,650
578,835
55
200
800
3,800
30,000
Purchase
Transaction
$140,131
$5,634,479
$320
$2,595
$9,500
$32,000
$228,750
Value
Sale Transaction
$469,564 $21,072,430 $1,428 $6,275 $22,345 $92,951
$851,840
Value
Resulting Shares
2,290,197
69,945,542
612
7,776
43,227
295,000
3,821,240
Held
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Table 2
Distribution and Frequency of Transactions
This table provides the distribution and frequencies of insider transactions at the individual level. Panel A
has the number of insiders with zero, 1, 2, 3 to 5, 6 to 10, 11 to 20 and more than 21 purchase and sales
transaction along with their corresponding percentages. Panel B has the minimum number of transactions
made by an insider, with the maximum, mean, 5th percentile, 25th percentile, median, 75th percentile and
99th percentile.
Panel A: Number of Transactions - Frequency
Variable
Purchase Transactions
Sale Transactions
Number of Insiders % of Insiders Number of Insiders % of Insiders
Zero Transactions
44,514
36%
56,240
45%
1 Transaction
31,512
25%
19,919
16%
2 Transactions
13,891
11%
10,207
8%
3 to 5 Transactions
16,622
13%
13,949
11%
6 to 10 Transactions
8,966
7%
8,910
7%
4,936
4%
6,510
5%
11 to 20 Transactions1
More than 21 Transactions
3,568
3%
8,274
7%

Panel B: Number of Transactions – Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Min
Max
Mean
Individual Purchases
0
2,770
4
Individual Sales
0
48,889
10

5%
0
0

25%
0
0

50%
1
1

75%
3
4

99%
14
17
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Table 3
Summary Statistics
This table provides summary statistics for variables used in the study. The sample period is 1986-2012.
PR_All Insiderst is the purchase ratio of all insiders (directors and officers) in year t, computed as the
number of shares purchased by all insiders divided by the number of shares purchased and sold by all
insiders. PR_Officerst and PR_Directorst are the purchases ratios for officers-only and directors only
respectively in year t. BMt is the book-to-market ratio in year t defined as the book value of equity
(COMPUSTAT: CEQ) scaled by MVEt. MVEt is the market value of equity at the end of year t defined as
common shares outstanding at the end of year t multiplied by the closing stock price of the year
(COMPUSTAT: CSHO multiplied by the stock’s closing stock price at the end of year from CRSP).
MARet(t+1) is next year’s market-adjusted stock return measured as the firm’s 12-month cumulative return in
year t+1 minus the corresponding12-month return on the valued weighted index. ROA(t+1) is the return on
asset for year t+1 measured as income before extraordinary items (COMPUSTAT: IB) scaled by total
assets (COMPUSTAT: AT). ∆ROA(t+1) is next year’s first difference in ROA measures as ROA in year t+1
minus ROA in year t. InsiderRett is the Modified Dietz return on the portfolio of the firm’s shares held by
all insiders (director and officers) computed over year t; it is our measure of insider trading returns. InsiderlossDummyt is an indicator which equals one if InsiderRett is negative and zero if positive. DirectorsRett
and OfficersRett are the insider returns for directors-only and officers-only. Directors-lossDummyt and
Officers-lossDummyt are indicator variables if DirectorsRett and OfficersRett are respectively negative and
zero if positive.
Variable

Mean

Std

5%

25%

50%

75%

95%

PR_All Insiderst

0.462

0.452

0.000

0.000

0.296

1.000

1.000

PR_Officerst

0.433

0.470

0.000

0.000

0.087

1.000

1.000

PR_Directorst

0.523

0.468

0.000

0.000

0.613

1.000

1.000

BMt

0.637

3.785

0.063

0.279

0.502

0.815

1.790

MVEt

2,752

310,303

11.5

65.9

261.1

1,048.6

9,593.1

MARet(t+1)

0.065

0.983

-0.740

-0.326

-0.053

0.242

1.116

ROA(t+1)

-0.058

0.929

-0.515

-0.019

0.018

0.063

0.148

∆ROA(t+1)

-0.021

0.926

-0.262

-0.029

0.000

0.019

0.203
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InsiderRett

0.112

1.980

-0.996

-0.090

-0.028

0.089

1.613

Insider - lossDummyt

0.587

0.492

0.000

0.000

1.000

1.000

1.000

DirectorsRett

0.086

1.431

-0.577

-0.083

-0.018

0.053

1.039

Directors - lossDummyt

0.578

0.494

0.000

0.000

1.000

1.000

1.000

OfficersRett

0.107

1.566

-0.713

-0.079

-0.012

0.067

1.234

Officers - lossDummyt

0.557

0.497

0.000

0.000

1.000

1.000

1.000

Table 4
The Impact of Insider Returns on the Purchase Ratios
This table presents multivariate regressions to assess the relation between insider trading returns and
purchase ratios. The dependent variable is PRt is the purchase ratio of all insiders (directors and officers) in
year t, computed as the number of shares purchased by all insiders divided by the number of shares
purchased and sold by all insiders. Panel A uses Fama-MacBeth regressions where the model is estimated
annually and the average annual coefficients are tested against the null of zero using standard errors from
the empirically derived distribution of the annual coefficients. Average coefficients are presented in panel
A. Panel B employs fixed effects regressions with firm and year effects. GoodRet(t+1) is an indicator
variable equal to 1 if the stock’s next year’s market adjusted return is greater than zero else equal to zero.
GoodRoA(t+1) is an indicator variable equal to one if next year’s change in ROA is greater than zero else
equals to zero. GoodRoAt is an indicator variable equal to one if the current year’s change in ROA is
greater than zero else equals to zero. BM1t to BM4t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the book-to-market
ratio is in the i’th quintile of year t’s book-to-market distribution. HRett and Mrett is an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the market adjusted stock return is in the high trecile and middle trecile respectively of year t’s
distribution of realized market adjusted returns. InsiderRett is the Modified Dietz return on the portfolio of
the firm’s shares held by all insiders (director and officers) computed over year t; it is our measure of
insider trading returns. LossDummyt is an indicator which equals one if InsiderRett is negative and zero if
positive. (InsiderRet X Loss)t is an interaction variable between InsiderRett and LossDummyt. The sample
period is 1986-2012 and the insider trading returns variable, InsiderRett is winsorized at 1% on each tail.
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Panel A: Fama-MacBeth Regressions
Dependent variable = PRt
Hypotheses

Variables
[1]
0.6383***

[2]
0.6005***

[3]
0.6143***

GoodRet(t+1) (+)

0.0056

0.012

0.0032

GoodRoA(t+1) (+)

0.0320***

0.0366**

0.0330***

Intercept
Superior Information

GoodRoAt (+)
Undervaluation

BM1t (-)

-0.0114

-0.014

-0.0066

-0.2620***

-0.2289***

-0.2764***
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BM2t (-)

-0.2681***

-0.2560***

-0.2790***

BM3t (-)

-0.1911***

-0.1446***

-0.1978***

BM4t (-)

-0.1014***

-0.0665

-0.1196***

HRett (-)

-0.0775***

-0.0864***

-0.0655***

MRett (-)

-0.0539***

-0.0424**

-0.0505***

0.0021***

0.0002

InsiderRett
Loss Aversion

LossDummy

0.0248**

(InsiderRet X Loss)t

0.0054***

Panel B: Firm Fixed Effects Regressions
Dependent variable = PRt
Hypotheses
Superior Information

Undervaluation

Variables
Intercept

[1]
0.0367***

[2]
0.0358***

[3]
0.0352***

GoodRet(t+1) (+)

0.0386***

0.0384***

0.0400***

GoodRoA(t+1) (+)

0.0005

0.0002

0.0012

GoodRoAt (+)

-0.2716***

-0.2768***

-0.2682***

BM1t (-)

-0.2249***

-0.2294***

-0.2239***

BM2t (-)

-0.1539***

-0.1550***

-0.1520***

BM3t (-)

-0.0805***

-0.0806***

-0.0793***

BM4t (-)

-0.0497***

-0.0520***

-0.0395***

HRett (-)

-0.0363***

-0.0377***

-0.0331***

0.0012***

-0.0002

MRett (-)
Loss Aversion
Firm effects
Year effects

InsiderRett

0.0247***

(InsiderRet X Loss)t

0.0044***
Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included
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Table 5
The Relation between Insider Purchase Ratios and Insider Returns – Officers versus
Directors
This table presents multivariate regressions to compare the loss aversion of directors versus officers with
respect to purchase ratios. The dependent variable is PRt is the purchase ratio of officers-only in models 1
and 3; and directors-only in models 2 and 4 in year t,. Panel A uses Fama-MacBeth regressions where the
model is estimated annually and the average annual coefficients are tested against the null of zero using
standard errors from the empirically derived distribution of the annual coefficients. Average coefficients
are presented in panel A. Panel B employs fixed effects regressions with firm and year effects. GoodRet(t+1)
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the stock’s next year’s market adjusted return is greater than zero else
equal to zero. GoodRoA(t+1) is an indicator variable equal to one if next year’s change in ROA is greater
than zero else equals to zero. GoodRoAt is an indicator variable equal to one if the current year’s change in
ROA is greater than zero else equals to zero. BM1t to BM4t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bookto-market ratio is in the i’th quintile of year t’s book-to-market distribution. HRett and Mrett is an indicator
variable equal to 1 if the market adjusted stock return is in the high trecile and middle trecile respectively of
year t’s distribution of realized market adjusted returns. OfficersRett and DirectorRett are the Modified
Dietz returns on the portfolio of the firm’s shares held by officers-only and directors only respectively
computed over year t; they are our measures of officer-only and director only trading returns respectively.
OfficersLossDummyt and DirectorsLossDummyt are indicators which equals one if OfficersRett and
DirectorsRett are negative and zero if positive, respectively. (OfficersRet X Loss)t .and (DirectorRet X
Loss)t are interaction variables between OfficersRett and OfficersLossDummyt; and DirectorsRett and
DirectorsLossDummyt respectively The sample period is 1986-2012. OfficersRett, and DirectorsRett are
winsorized at 1% on each tail. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively.
Panel A: Fama-MacBeth Regressions
Dependent variable = PRt
Hypotheses

Variables
Intercept

Superior
Information

GoodRet(t+1) (+)

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

0.6375***

0.6732***

0.6300***

0.6485***

-0.0029

0.0081238

-0.0044

0.0074274
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GoodRoA(t+1) (+)

0.0354***

0.0222***

0.0362***

0.0247***

-0.0117

-0.0136258

-0.0098

-0.0125439

BM1t (-)

-0.3291***

-0.2494***

-0.3182***

-0.2377***

BM2t (-)

-0.3276***

-0.2567***

-0.3189***

-0.2478***

BM3t (-)

-0.2443***

-0.1584***

-0.2404***

-0.1540***

BM4t (-)

-0.1389***

-0.0987***

-0.1370***

-0.0976***

HRett (-)

-0.0736***

-0.0898***

-0.0582***

-0.0618***

MRett (-)

-0.0657***

-0.0447**

-0.0592***

-0.0328v*

OfficersRett

0.0022***

GoodRoAt (+)
Undervaluation

Loss Aversion

0.0002

OfficersLossDummyt

0.0277***

(OfficersRet X Loss)t

0.0079***

DirectorsRett

0.0022***

-0.0007***

DirectorsLossDummyt

0.0541***

(DirectorsRet X Loss)t

0.0107***

Panel B: Firm Fixed Effects Regressions
Dependent variable = PRt
Hypotheses
Superior
Information

Variables
[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

0.0329***

0.0313***

0.0318***

0.0304***

0.0445***

0.0246***

0.0451***

0.0267***

0.0003

-0.0039

0.001

-0.0031***

BM1t (-)

-0.2919***

-0.2597***

-0.2829***

-0.2433***

BM2t (-)

-0.2422***

-0.2198***

-0.2378***

-0.2089***

BM3t (-)

-0.1725***

-0.1349***

-0.1699***

-0.1289***

BM4t (-)

-0.0914***

-0.0722***

-0.0904***

-0.0688***

HRett (-)

-0.0469***

-0.0623***

-0.0356***

-0.0381***

MRett (-)

-0.0345***

-0.0400***

-0.0303***

-0.0295***

OfficersRett

0.0015***

GoodRet(t+1) (+)
GoodRoA(t+1) (+)
GoodRoAt (+)

Undervaluation

Loss Aversion

-0.00004
0.0191***

LossDummyt
(OfficersRet X
Loss)t

0.0052***
0.0015***

DirectorsRett

-0.0008***
0.0516***

LossDummyt
(DirectorsRet X
Loss)t

0.0087***

Firm effects

Included

Included

Included

Included

Year effects

Included

Included

Included

Included
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Table 6
The Relation between Insider Returns and the Decision to Purchase
This table presents firm fixed effects logit regressions to assess the relation between insider trading returns
and insiders’ decisions to purchase shares. The dependent variable is Purchasei,t is an indicator variable that
equals one if shares are purchased in year t else it is equal to zero. GoodRet(t+1) is an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the stock’s next year’s market adjusted return is greater than zero else equal to zero.
GoodRoA(t+1) is an indicator variable equal to one if next year’s change in ROA is greater than zero else
equals to zero. GoodRoAt is an indicator variable equal to one if the current year’s change in ROA is
greater than zero else equals to zero. BM1t to BM4t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the book-to-market
ratio is in the i’th quintile of year t’s book-to-market distribution. HRett and Mrett is an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the market adjusted stock return is in the high trecile and middle trecile respectively of year t’s
distribution of realized market adjusted returns. InsiderRett is the Modified Dietz return on the portfolio of
the firm’s shares held by all insiders (director and officers) computed over year t; it is our measure of
insider trading returns. LossDummyt is an indicator which equals one if InsiderRett is negative and zero if
positive. (InsiderRet X Loss)t is an interaction variable between InsiderRett and LossDummyt. The sample
period is 1986-2012 and the insider trading returns variable, InsiderRett is winsorized at 1% on each tail.
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Dependent Variable = Purchasei,t
Hypotheses
Superior Information

Variables
[1]

[2]

[3]

GoodRet(t+1) (+)

0.1338***

0.1349***

0.1335***

GoodRoA(t+1) (+)

0.1666***

0.1651***

0.1670***

GoodRoAt (+)
Undervaluation

0.0158

0.0154

0.0156

BM1t (-)

-0.8829***

-0.8807***

-0.8796***

BM2t (-)

-0.7520***

-0.7485***

-0.7478***

BM3t (-)

-0.5167***

-0.5214***

-0.5208***

BM4t (-)

-0.2689***

-0.2712***

-0.2699***

HRett (-)

-0.3819***

-0.3838***

-0.3937***

MRett (-)

-0.2529***

-0.2561***

-0.2633***
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InsiderRett
Loss Aversion
Firm effects

0.00533***

0.00268***

LossDummy

-0.0825***

(InsiderRet X Loss)t

Year effects

Included

Included

0.00469***
Included

Included

Included

Included

Table 7
Economic Impact of Loss Aversion - Being Loss Averse and Acting upon it versus Being
Loss Averse and ignoring it
This table examines the economic impact of loss aversion on the wealth of insiders by identifying a
subsample of insiders who have losses and are predicted not to purchase due to loss aversion. Then splitting
this subsample into a group that acts upon their loss aversion by not purchasing and a second group that are
supposedly loss averse but decide to ignore their loss aversion by purchasing and comparing their returns.
InsiderRett is the Modified Dietz return on the portfolio of the firm’s shares held by all insiders (director
and officers) computed over year t; it is our measure of insider trading returns. MarketAdjStockRet(t+1) is
next year’s market-adjusted stock return measured as the firm’s 12-month cumulative return in year t+1
minus the corresponding12-month return on the valued weighted index; it is a measure of the firm’s future
performance and measures insiders’ potential gain from trading the firm’s stock as opposed to the market
portfolio.
T-test for
Mean Value
differences
of means (pVariable
Group 1: No Insider Purchase
Group2:Insider Purchase
value)
InsiderRett

-10.0501

-6.7995

0.0313

MarketAdjStockRet(t+1)

-0.0570

0.0814

0.0526
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Table 8
Economic Impact of Loss Aversion - Firm Specific Loss Aversion Coefficients and Insider
Market Timing Ability
This table examines the economic impact of loss aversion on the wealth of insiders by using a mixed
logistic model to get firm specific loss aversion coefficients and forming quartiles based on these
coefficients to test insider market timing ability across loss sensitivity quartiles. The first quartile has the
least loss averse insiders and the fourth quartile has the most lost averse insiders. InsiderRett is the
Modified Dietz return on the portfolio of the firm’s shares held by all insiders (director and officers)
computed over year t; and approximates the dollar weighted return.. AnnualRett year t’s stock return
measured as the firm’s 12-month cumulative return in year t; it measures the time weighted return.
Quartiles

Mean value of InsiderRett minus AnnualRett

1

1.99%

2

3.75%

3

4.63%

4

-0.82%

